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BITPROPERTY
JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD*
ABSTRACT
Property is the law of lists and ledgers. County land records, stock
certificate entries, mortgage registries, Uniform Commercial Code filings
on personal property, copyright and patent registries of interests in
intellectual property, bank accounts, domain name systems, and
consumers’ Kindle e-book collections in the cloud are all merely entries in
a list, determining who owns what.
Each such list has suffered a traditional limitation. To prevent
falsification or duplication, a single entity must maintain the list, and users
must trust (and pay) that entity. As a result, transactions must proceed at
significant expense and delay. Yet zero or near-zero transaction costs are
the fuel of Internet scalability. Property transactions have not yet truly
undergone an Internet revolution at least partly because they are
constrained by the cost of creating centralized trusted authorities.
This Article reimagines the contours of digital property if that central
constraint were removed. There is every reason to believe it can be.
Increased interest in cryptocurrencies has driven the development of a
series of technologies for creating public, cryptographically secure ledgers
of property interests that do not rely on trust in a specific entity to curate
the list. Previously, the digital objects that users could buy and sell online
were not rivalrous in the same way as offline physical objects, unless some
centralized entity such as a social network, digital currency issuer, or game
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. Thanks to the participants
at the Digital Asset Transfer Authority 2014 meeting, the 2014 ACI Virtual Currency conferences, the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, and the SEALS Panel on Neo-Technological Property Theories
for input and improvement. Thank you in particular to Juliet Moringiello and James Grimmelmann for
comments and suggestions. Thank you to Google’s Mike Shick for the dice-rolling metaphor for SHA256. Thanks to Hannah Shtein, Natalie Wengroff, and Paul Keith for research assistance, and to the
Frances Lewis Law Center for support during the drafting of this piece.
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company served the function of trusted list curator. Trustless public ledgers
change this dynamic. Counterparties can hand one another digital,
rivalrous objects in the same way that they used to hand each other gold
bars or dollar bills. No intermediary or curator is needed.
In addition, the advent of this technology provides an opportunity to
discuss property interests in information environments. Property online is
currently anemic. Consumers control few online resources and own even
fewer. This is in no small part due to antiquated notions of property as the
law of physical, tangible resources. Given new technology that can create
digital, scarce, and rival intangible assets, these basic assumptions should
be reexamined and replaced with a theory of property as an information
communication and storage system. That is the project of this piece.
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INTRODUCTION
Property is the law of lists and ledgers. The vast bulk of owned wealth
is recorded in systems that tell users who owns what.1 County courthouse
land records, Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) security interest filing
systems, electronic chattel paper, the stock clearing house system, the
Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”), Automated Clearing
House (“ACH”) transactions, bank accounts, intellectual property interests
filed with federal registries, and consumer-purchased music through iTunes
are all just entries in a ledger associating an identity with an interest in a
resource.2
This Article explores the practical and theoretical ramifications of
recent advances in ledgers used to track and convey property interests.
1. Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1363–64 (2010) (“Public land title records
have been a fundamental feature of American law since before the founding of the
Republic. . . . Perhaps then, it is not surprising that in the early seventeenth century, Americans began
experimenting with laws requiring that parties create public records of conveyances and mortgages.”).
2. See, e.g., JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 9.03 (4th
ed. 2013) (“In 2004, MERS extended the scope of its services by creating an ‘eRegistry’ to establish a
central registry of interests in ‘eNotes’ or electronic promissory notes used in residential real estate
transactions.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)relevance of
(In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 124–25 (2007) [hereinafter Moringiello, False Categories]
(“Articles 7 and 9 of the U.C.C. now provide for electronic documents of title and electronic chattel
paper, respectively . . . .”); David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 224 (2004) (“[Some of] the information that prospective
licensees and licensors need to enter into efficient transactions . . . already exists in public intellectual
property registries, such as those maintained by the U.S. Patent and Copyright Offices.”).
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Bitcoin is a rapidly developing digital currency.3 The underlying
technology (called the “block chain”)4 has nothing in particular to do with
money, however. Block chain technology instead represents a significant
advance in tracking information about who owns what. It does so through a
distributed public ledger that does not require trust in other parties or in a
central list authority, and is robustly resistant to falsification.5 As venture
capitalist Marc Andreessen wrote for the New York Times:
Bitcoin gives us, for the first time, a way for one Internet user to transfer
a unique piece of digital property to another Internet user, such that the
transfer is guaranteed to be safe and secure, everyone knows that the
transfer has taken place, and nobody can challenge the legitimacy of the
transfer. The consequences of this breakthrough are hard to overstate.6

Most of the discussion in the legal literature and news media to date
has centered around the use of such public ledgers as a substitute for
currency.7 However, a distributed public ledger system confers not just the
power to transfer dollars, but also the power to transfer anything:
What kinds of digital property might be transferred in this way? Think
about digital signatures, digital contracts, digital keys (to physical locks,
3. This Article is more concerned with the underlying technology of public ledgers than it is
with the success or failure of the specific implementation of Bitcoin. Thus, questions of the volatile
price of Bitcoin or other concerns related to the success of that specific implementation are given
limited attention in this piece.
4. See infra notes 30, 36–37 and accompanying text.
5. Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case
Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 116 (2012).
6. Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters.
7. See generally Paul H. Farmer, Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire and the Need
for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85 (2014) (outlining the legal implications of categorizing
Bitcoin as a currency); Jordon L. Ludwig, Note, Protections for Virtual Property: A Modern
Restitutionary Approach, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing disputes over property in
virtual worlds); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159 (2012) (discussing whether Bitcoin can be a sustainable currency); Stephen T.
Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues
and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813 (2014) (discussing the regulation of
cryptocurrencies); Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member
LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2014) (discussing Bitcoin as a substitute for traditional financial
systems); Kaplanov, supra note 5 (discussing the regulation of Bitcoin); Ruoke Yang, When is Bitcoin a
Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 99, 108 (2013) (discussing whether
Bitcoin is a security); Derek Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today:
Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 165 (2013)
(discussing the regulatory policy implications for Bitcoin); Joshua Doguet, The Nature of the Form:
Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119
(2013) (discussing the merits of Bitcoin as a digital currency); Danton Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money
Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 IND. L.J. 441 (2014) (discussing the money laundering
implications for Bitcoin).
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or to online lockers), digital ownership of physical assets such as cars
and houses, digital stocks and bonds . . . and digital money.8

Thus, “[f]or the first time, two people can exchange a piece of digital
property, without any prior relationship, and in a secure way, over the
Internet.”9 This functionality extends well beyond the use of trustless
ledgers as online money. “The breakthrough means that, theoretically, any
act of commerce on the Web can be decentralized and stripped of a
controlling authority.”10 The ability to disintermediate and decentralize
significant portions of online activity can significantly disrupt and improve
online ownership and the legal regimes that govern it.11
This Article addresses the potential for change in property law and the
accompanying needed changes to property theory. Trustless ledgers offer
the potential to significantly address one of the great inefficiencies of
modern property: its reliance on expensive, inaccurate, hard-to-access,
hard-to-search, and insecure ledgers of all stripes.12 Trustless technology
can significantly reduce information costs and increase certainty across the
law of property.13 Dusty and unsearchable courthouse land records can be
made public and verifiable, and bank accounts can be made fully traceable,
even down to the pennies, over years’ worth of time.
At the outset, one caveat is important. The success or failure of
Bitcoin in particular is ultimately of only passing interest.14 “Bitcoin is an
experiment,” noted developer Gavin Andresen, and “maybe it will change
the world, but realise that investing . . . in new ideas is always risky.”15 It is
8. Andreessen, supra note 6.
9. Rob Wile, Satoshi’s Revolution: How the Creator of Bitcoin May Have Stumbled Onto
Something Much, Much Bigger, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 22, 2014, 11:50 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-future-of-the-blockchain-2014-4 (quoting interview with Bitcoin
developer Jeff Garzik).
10. Id.
11. See Pete Rizzo, VC Fred Wilson: Block Chain Could Be Bigger Opportunity than Bitcoin,
COINDESK (May 5, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/vc-fred-wilson-block-chain-biggeropportunity-bitcoin (Fred Wilson, founder of Union Square Ventures, discussing the block chain’s
potential for disruptive innovation outside of the currency and payment spaces).
12. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 116 (“The bitcoin technology ensures that online transactions
are: (1) secure; (2) efficient; and (3) free of third party presence—whether that third party is a
government, bank, payment network, or clearinghouse.”).
13. See id. at 125 (“By creating a two-party payment system for online transactions, the cost of
the transaction is reduced, thereby nearly eliminating the added costs to the consumer.”).
14. Virtual Currencies: Mining Digital Gold, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576149-even-if-it-crashes-bitcoin-maymake-dent-financial-world-mining-digital.
15. See Virtual Currency Schemes, EUR. CENT. BANK 27 (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf
(quoting
Gavin
Andresen, That Which Does Not Kill Us Makes Us Stronger, GAVINTHINK (June 20, 2011, 11:56 AM),
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probable that security flaws in trustless public ledgers, their infrastructure,
or their implementation will be discovered. Some already have been. This
Article analyzes the potential for the technology to impact online property
regimes, not the soundness of any one implementation. Thus, as The
Economist noted, “[j]ust like Napster, Bitcoin may crash but leave a lasting
legacy.”16
Instead of offering a paean to Bitcoin, this Article makes use of the
advent of this potentially disruptive technology17 to reflect on property
theory,18 which has badly and barely managed the transition to the online
ecosystem.19 Whereas contract and tort law have survived the digital
transition more or less intact, online property interests are either intellectual
property interests or strange amalgams of contract, licensing, and
pseudoproperty law, such as those that govern users’ interests in e-books,
MP3s, software, or downloaded movies.20 Traditional property law, with its
virtues of simplicity, modularity, decentralization, disintermediation,
http://gavinthink.blogspot.com/2011/06/that-which-does-not-kill-us-makes-us.html).
16. Virtual Currencies: Mining Digital Gold, supra note 14. See also Michael Sivy, The Real
Significance of the Bitcoin Boom (and Bust), TIME (Apr. 12, 2013), http://business.time.com/
2013/04/12/the-real-significance-of-the-bitcoin-boom-and-bust/ (“But the Bitcoin phenomenon is more
than a bubble. It says something important about the current and future state of the global
economy. . . . However the current boom-and-bust plays out, Bitcoin is the beginning of something, not
the end.”); T.S., The Economist Explains: How Does Bitcoin Work?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013, 11:50
PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-doesbitcoin-work (“Just as BitTorrent was not the first file-sharing service and Skype was not the first
voice-over-internet service, it may be that Bitcoin will be a pioneer in the field of virtual currencies, but
will be overshadowed by an easier-to-use rival.”).
17. Disruption in the technological context means a technological advance that unsettles legacy
actors in an area, permitting new entrants to gain traction in the market. CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE
INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL xv–xvi (1997).
18. See, e.g., Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the Future?, 24
J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 272, 279 (2013) (“Bitcoins are a form of intangible private property, a
valuable digital artefact. They are not a contractual promise by or debt owed by one party to another.
They are an asset and are the valuable property of their current owner, who can transfer them as and
when she pleases.”).
19. See, e.g., Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 120 (“Classifying property
according to its tangibility or intangibility creates false categories unrelated to significant legal
distinctions, and these false categories hinder the ability of commercial law to expand to adequately
accommodate electronic assets.”).
20. See id. (arguing that moving away from the distinction between tangible and intangible assets
in property law “will allow commercial law to more readily adapt to the proliferation of emerging
electronic assets that do not fit into established categories of intangible rights such as intellectual
property and payment rights”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1052
(2005) [hereinafter Fairfield, Virtual Property] (“[U]nreasonable contractual restraints on alienation are
eliminated by the law of property. But currently in the context of the internet, we have imported the
common law of contract wholesale, without the counterbalance of property law. As a result, emergent
useful property forms are being eliminated by contract.”).
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equalization, independence, and certainty, has not made the transition
well.21 Until recently, it has been hard, even impossible, to own a digital
object in the same way that one owns a car or a farm. That impossibility
has now begun to give way to human ingenuity, and so theorists must make
straight the way for true digital ownership interests.
Property law is ripe for an information revolution. Information
applications scale rapidly when costs fall.22 Property has not benefitted
from the scaling effect of drastically reduced information costs because
property law has been traditionally understood as being concerned with
tangible objects, rather than information. The perhaps oversimplified
statement of the problem is that one cannot send property over the Internet.
Given the robust trade in digital objects, this is demonstrably not true, but
there is a deeper issue. The very first move of property is to dissociate the
property interest from the object. Property does not consist in the thing
itself; rather, property consists in the packaging, tracking and transmission
of information about the dissociation between interest and resource. The
property interest, being information, can of course be conveyed using
information systems. In short, property law is not primarily concerned with
things, but with information. Structuring, streamlining, packaging,
transmitting, storing, searching, and verifying this information is the work
of property law.
From this perspective, then, property is information: who owns
what.23 Of course, property captures more interests than bare ownership,
but the rule generalizes: property can be usefully viewed as that set of
information describing who may do what, when, and with which resource.
Good property rules are ones that package, convey, transmit, or verify such
information in ways that reduce information costs, and a good property
system is one that communicates this information and transfers the attached
resources to new identities with minimal friction.24 One can rate good
property systems by how well they store and communicate information
about who owns what, and can identify poor property systems by how
much noise and confusion their information search, storage, and transfer
21. See generally Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2 (arguing that classifying property
according to its tangibility poses challenges for classifying electronic assets).
22. Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the
Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 347–48 (2008) (“The Internet fosters innovation
by eliminating transaction costs, enabling new services to emerge.”).
23. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 125–41 (discussing what may or may not
be property under UCC Section 9).
24. See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 22, at 348–49 (discussing how the Internet has benefitted from
economies of scale, allowing users to capitalize on existing resources with minimal friction).
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protocols create.25
A theory of property as information has serious advantages over prior
conceptions. It permits the extension of traditional property rules to digital
and smart property, and avoids the false constraints of current theory.26 For
instance, it simply does not matter whether the property one considers is
tangible or intangible.27 Whether I hold a physical dollar in my hand or
hold a dollar credited in a bank account makes no practical difference.28
That false distinction has long bedeviled property theory and has
particularly impeded the growth of robust markets in online property.29 A
theory of property as information puts paid to these notions. It makes clear
that property is an information application, best understood through the
lens of information theory. As a result, traditional property law is entirely
practicable in information environments.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes trustless public
ledger technology, with a particular focus on block chain technology and
the nascent regulatory regimes surrounding it. Part II makes the case for
treating property as a protocol for communicating and storing information,
and demonstrates how property can function well in information
environments. Part III offers some concrete suggestions as to how block
chain technology could, combined with advances in theory, lay the
foundation for a powerful and flexible system for digital property.
I. TRUSTLESS TECHNOLOGY
This part discusses technology that strongly reduces information costs
in online property systems. The following sections provide a brief overview
of how trustless technology creates the possibility for rapid Internet scaling
of property applications, before describing the technical details of
implementing a trustless system through the expedient of a public ledger.
25. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 552 (2005) (“[A] property system with stable rights increases the value of assets to users (now
owners) and decreases the costs of obtaining and defending those assets.”).
26. See generally Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2.
27. See id. at 137, 141 (“Despite the fact that individuals commonly think of intangible rights
embodied in almost worthless tangible things as property, intangible rights unconnected to tangible
things continue to confound judges. . . . The intangible nature of assets . . . seems to blind courts to
general property principles.”).
28. Juliet Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159, 176
(2010) [hereinafter Moringiello, Virtual Worlds] (“In a sense, all money is virtual.”); Moringiello, False
Categories, supra note 2, at 136 (“Most of us would consider our bank accounts to be our property
notwithstanding the intangibility of the bank account.”).
29. See id. at 141–43 (discussing how the intangibility of online assets has caused confusion in
the courts).

2015]

BITPROPERTY

813

The discussion continues with a description of the different possible use
cases for trustless architectures and the regulatory regimes that have to date
been brought to bear. Bitcoin as a specific implementation, and the
technological characteristics of that specific implementation, are only
discussed here insofar as they help the reader understand the core points
about digital property and trustless public ledgers.30
A. TRUSTLESS PUBLIC LEDGERS
The primary information cost in online property systems is trust. Users
must trust that any registry or ledger of property rights is accurate and
secure. These verification costs are generally paid by users to a centralized
authority that maintains the register of rights. Trustless ledgers, by contrast,
are a communications protocol that reduces information costs by
eliminating the need for trust in a central curator. Such ledgers enable peerto-peer digital property transactions without intermediaries.31 This is the
concept of trustlessness.
As an example, one might consider the balance in a bank account. The
account itself is a mere entry in a private ledger maintained by the bank.
Trust in the bank account depends on trust in the bank.32 If trust in the bank
fails, the bank account is no longer a store of value, but a useless entry on
the bank’s ledger. Parties can trust such centralized ledgers only as far as
they can trust the centralized authority.33 In the case of bank deposit
accounts, such trust might be justified. In the case of 1980s-era Savings and
30. A few definitions apply throughout. The term “trustless” is used here to encompass a band of
extremely low-trust applications based on a distributed public ledger that is secured by an effective
proof system to ensure the integrity of the ledger despite its decentralization. Note that “trustless” does
not imply a lack of trust in the system. To the contrary: it implies that the system is sufficiently
trustworthy that no one actor within the system needs to be trusted for the system to work. “Block
chain” refers to a kind of public ledger that relies on a distributed proof system to prevent falsification
or double spending. The term “block chain” can refer either to the Bitcoin block chain, or to the block
chain underlying an alternative chain application. When referred to in the singular, “the block chain”
refers to the Bitcoin block chain. “Bitcoin” itself refers to the currency implementation—just one
example of trustless public ledger architecture, although it is by far the best-known example. This
terminological distinction between Bitcoin and the underlying block chain is important, because it is
precisely that distinction that permits innovators to envision building non-currency applications using
trustless public ledger architecture.
31. See, e.g., Barrett Sheridan, Bitcoins: Currency of the Geeks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 16,
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_26/b4234041554873.htm (explaining how
Bitcoin transactions do not require a “middleman”).
32. See Moringiello, Virtual Worlds, supra note 28 at 176 (“Money is based on trust; currency
has value because people trust that it can be exchanged for items of value and other currencies.”).
33. Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 9–10 (“People are willing to accept [currency]
in exchange for goods and services simply because they trust this central authority. Trust is therefore a
crucial element of any fiat money system.”).
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Loans, it would not. Trust in the ledger entry of a bank account is only as
good as the trust in the institution that maintains it.34
Enormous resources currently go into generating trust, which makes
trust-based systems expensive.35 To maintain trust, the centralized authority
must restrict access to the ledger, while itself submitting to expensive (but
necessary) oversight to ensure its own trustworthiness. If just anyone could
change the ledger, under the traditional system, trust would evaporate.
Even if one were inclined to trust the centralized administrator, one could
not possibly trust everyone who could make changes to the centralized
ledger. Consider, for example, a case in which all customers were free to
edit their bank account balances at will. This would reduce the transaction
and processing costs of maintaining the ledger system (since the bank
would not have to pay for systems and people to do so) but would also
destroy trust in the system.
Trustless public ledgers are a proposed solution to the problem of
expensive trust. Bitcoin is the best known implementation, and thus serves
as a good example here. The Bitcoin protocol creates a ledger out of a
series of groups of transactions, termed simply “blocks,” which as a whole
form a log of all transfers, termed the “block chain.”36 The block chain is
not maintained by any single entity, but instead relies on a mathematically
innovative consensus model.37 Bitcoin creates a manipulation-resistant
solution to the problem of trust—a way of providing verification without
centralization and its attendant risks and costs. This mechanism is
discussed at more length in Section I.B, below.
Trustless public ledger systems are of course neither entirely devoid of
trust38 nor completely zero cost.39 The systems propose only to
significantly reduce the need for trust and its associated costs. Reduction of
the need for trust eliminates a constant source of friction in online
transactions. Internet technologies scale most disruptively at near-zero
34. See id.
35. See generally Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV.
457, 474–76 (2001).
36. See supra note 30 (defining “block chain”).
37. See Sheridan, supra note 31 (discussing the mechanics of Bitcoin).
38. For example, even if one does not trust a central authority, one might trust the
implementation of the protocol, the actors who implement the protocol, or the essential mathematical
soundness of the protocol itself in the face of sustained and highly motivated attack.
39. For example, bitcoin miners are incentivized to perform the verification function through
grants of new bitcoins. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. This creates a functional tax through
inflation.
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transaction costs.40 Transaction costs need not be zero, merely low enough
to open a range of new uses. The Internet, for all of its “free” price points,
is extraordinarily expensive to maintain. Yet near-zero costs have produced
a range of highly scaled and novel applications. For each drop in
transaction costs, a new range of widely scaled and potentially disruptive
uses becomes practicable.41 Eliminating the cost of trust creates the
possibility of true Internet-like scalability for property and currency
transactions.42
Trustless ledgers can and will reshape property law if they push price
points low enough to unleash disruptive and scalable applications. Property
registries as they currently stand are a hodgepodge of relatively inaccurate,
sometimes insecure, and often expensive ledgers.43 Property records are
notoriously costly to search.44 Companies that maintain ledgers (and cannot
perfectly price discriminate) have incentives to bar access to some potential
users in order to keep prices high. Access fees to ledger databases are often
well above what ordinary people can pay, and thus the systems do not
scale. As two scholars, describing unsuccessful attempts to reform the land
transfer system in 1939, lamented:
Yet for the achievement of such reforms without payment of undue and
continued tribute to private monopolies and without fruitless bother and
delay—perhaps even if they are to be achieved at all—major changes
must be effected in our antiquated, pre-commerce “system” of land
transfer. Cheap, expeditious, and secure methods must be designed, if
they are not already available, to replace the present complicated and
dilatory methods which, while costly to the individual and burdensome
to the public, afford no adequate security of title. Streamlined need
cannot long endure horse-and-buggy obstacles to the liquidity of land. It
is an ancient query, but its relevance grows: why should not a lot or a
farm be as easily acquired and as securely held as a ship or a share of
stock or an automobile?45
40. Werbach, supra note 22, at 347–48.
41. See id. at 349 (“Common networks facilitate innovation independent of the infrastructure
platform, which can create significantly more value than the network itself.”).
42. See Frankel, supra note 35, at 460 (“[I]f the risks and costs of reducing the risks to the
trusting party are higher than the benefits, it will not interact. If the costs to the trusted party of
establishing its trustworthiness are higher than the benefits, it will not interact.”).
43. Myres S. McDougal & John W. Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 YALE
L.J. 1125, 1126–29 (1939) (“Why cannot a lot or a farm be so easily acquired and securely held? The
answer can be found in any courthouse. It is in the wild disorder and the incompleteness of the public
records.”).
44. Peterson, supra note 1, at 1405.
45. McDougal & Brabner-Smith, supra note 43, at 1126 (footnotes omitted).
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The problems of centralization, oligopoly, expense, and inaccuracy
remain every bit as driving now as in 1939, and the central question
remains unchanged: why should not numerous different forms of property
be as easily acquired and as securely held as the simple switch of bits on a
digital ledger?46
More is at stake than saving dollars on a few property transactions.
Fixing property costs will change the Internet, not merely property law. A
major use of the Internet is the transfer of property interests. Alibaba, eBay,
and Amazon are prime examples.47 The cost of property interest transfers
operates as a component of, and thus a lower bound to, the efficiency of
Internet technologies. Assuming consumers have different preferences and
abilities to pay, there remains a range of transactions for which the
minimum transaction cost outweighs the welfare surplus for the consumer
or provider. These transactions do not occur because of cost, and the
welfare gain is not realized. The costs of searching, moving, and
maintaining interests in property act as a drag not only on individual actors
seeking to transact at lower costs, but on the entire online ecosystem. By
reducing the transaction costs associated with transferring property
interests, it is possible to remove a serious limit on the ability of electronic
applications to deliver welfare gains.48 Minimum transaction costs enable
microtransactions,49 and microtransactions enable a range of wealthgenerating behavior that is below the prior lower bounds of the property
and currency systems. The lower the bound, the more new trades become
possible; the smaller the transaction cost, the less wealth is simply left on
the cutting room floor.
B. BITS AND BOLTS
This section provides a very brief overview of the mechanics of block
chain technology, with a specific focus on new developments that make
trustless public ledgers, such as the block chain, an interesting technology
for property systems. The first subpart will deal with how trustless public
46. For the property initiate: this Article advances no position on the Torrens system itself, nor
does that debate bear on this piece except to the extent of the motivating concerns of cost, convenience,
and, in the context of Internet technologies, scalability.
47. See generally What is eBay, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.in/help/account/questions/aboutebay.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015); About Amazon, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/CareersHomepage/b?node=239364011 (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
48. See Werbach, supra note 22, at 347–48 (“The internet fosters innovation by eliminating
transaction costs, enabling new services to emerge.”).
49. Testimony of Jeremy Liew Before the New York State Department of Financial Services, N.Y.
STATE DEP’T FIN. SERVICES 1 (Jan. 28, 2014), http://dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014/liew.pdf.
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ledgers work, the second will explain how tokenized versions of existing
public ledgers might be adapted to serve as public ledgers for property
systems, and the third will deal with new developments in the technology
that are particularly well-suited to property applications.
1. How Trustless Public Ledgers Work
a. The Double-Spending Problem
To create a coherent and useful online property system, one must
solve the challenges of duplication and double spending.50 Duplication is
the first and most immediate problem.51 If users can duplicate digital
property, an MP3 for example, the marginal sale price commanded by the
good goes rapidly to zero. Similarly, if a currency can be duplicated, the
value of the currency evaporates under hyperinflation.
Double spending is a specific version of the duplication problem that
emerges in systems that enact partially effective duplication controls.52
Double spending occurs when the record owner of an asset conveys it
forward to two (or more) different entities.53 It is an exploit of the
conveyance mechanism in property systems. Such systems must permit
conveyance, but if conveyance can be from A to B, or from A to C, then A
may seek to benefit from a conveyance to B and then to C, with neither B
nor C knowing about the other.
Double spending becomes an issue whenever outright duplication has
been made cost-prohibitive by some measure (say, license servers for
MP3s, anti-forgery measures for land deeds, or anti-counterfeiting
measures for currencies), and it becomes cheaper to exploit the conveyance
50. David Frisch, Buyer Status Under the U.C.C.: A Suggested Temporal Definition, 72 IOWA L.
REV. 531, 531 (1987) (“The recognition of private property requires a comprehensive and systematic
body of detailed rules to permit and control the transfer of property. Although these rules must
necessarily comprehend innumerable transfer scenarios and force choices implicating difficult value
judgments, at the most basic level two problems must be confronted: (1) how to accomplish a transfer
of an item of property or an interest therein; and (2) how to resolve competing claims to the same item
or interest.”).
51. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity,
Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 454 (1996) (“Because the digital cash is
represented by a series of bits, and there are few things in this life easier to copy than bits, the bank is
going to be very anxious to ensure that any copies of the digital cash . . . will be unspendable, or at least
very easy to detect.”).
52. See J.P. & G.T., Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2011, 8:30 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency (“This provides a degree of
security against theft. But it does not prevent an owner of Bitcoins from spending his Bitcoins
twice . . . .”).
53. Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 117 n.35.
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mechanism than to counterfeit the asset directly. For example, when
counterfeiting dollars becomes hard and expensive, the petty crime of
choice becomes writing bad checks. Check fraud exploits a delay in the
currency conveyance system and enables the double spending of currency.
Double spending is a primary concern for both traditional property
systems54 and for cryptocurrencies.55 It is easy to see why cryptocurrencies
need to solve the double-spending problem. If one can spend the same
currency multiple times, recipients cannot trust payments.56 The creators of
public ledgers expressly noted that their design was an attempt to solve the
double-spending problem without resorting to centralized authorities.57
In this sense, the problems of public ledgers are the problems of
property law generally. Prevention of double spending is just as much a
central concern of traditional land conveyancing or personal property
transfers as it is of digital property or cryptocurrencies.58 Consider bona
fide purchasers of land, for example.59 A seller of land may convey land by
multiple deeds to multiple downstream purchasers: basic double spending.
The response of the law is a recording system, a ledger in which sales are
recorded, to limit the potential for double sales.
Yet recording acts do not eliminate the problem because buyers do not
have to record deeds in order for the transfer to be effective. Sellers can
still exploit the conveyance mechanism.60 So the law of conveyancing
relies on incentives to encourage parties to get their interests on record by
affording protection if the entry is recorded in the centralized ledger.61
Depending on the state recording act, a subsequent bona fide purchaser of
real estate, or a bona fide purchaser who files first, will take as against an
54. See id. at 117–18 (“In traditional payment systems, this problem is overcome by relying on a
central authority to check each transaction or by issuing a serial number to prevent double spending.”).
55. See id. at 116 (“[I]t may be difficult to prevent the same user from double spending the same
digital coins by copying them.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 116–17.
58. See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Soulé v. Gragg (In re Harrison), 503 B.R. 835, 843 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2013) (“The
rule is well established in [Oklahoma] that in the transfer of real estate in the absence of actual or
constructive notice of a previous conveyance or of matters which would put a purchaser on inquiry, a
bona fide purchaser for value will take good title to the property.”).
60. See, e.g., John W. Fisher, II, The Scope of Title Examination in West Virginia: Can
Reasonable Minds Differ?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 455 (1996) (“Since recording first is not necessary
to prevail against the ‘earlier’ unrecorded interest in a notice jurisdiction, the incentive to the
subsequent bona fide purchaser to record promptly is to protect the title she or he acquired from
‘another’ subsequent purchaser.”).
61. Id. at 454–56 (discussing past recording laws).
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unfiled interest in the land.62 This is a complicated and bad system for
curtailing double spending. The risk falls on the purchasers (who often both
have good faith) and does not directly reduce incentives to double spend in
the first place. The risk can continue to spread if buyers further convey
forward. A defect in title history can threaten downstream interests years
and sometimes decades later.
In short, all property conveyance systems share problems of
duplication and double spending. Until recently, there was only one
broadly workable solution. A central, trusted authority or network of
authorities was required to maintain the ledger and track, verify, and
register all transactions.63 For example, the Copyright Office verifies the
integrity of the register of copyrights; the Patent and Trademark Office
does the same for patents and trademarks; state Secretaries of State (for the
most part) play this role under the UCC personal property filing system;
and private entities like MERS and Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation fill similar roles for mortgages and stocks.64
Unsurprisingly, the first digital currencies followed a similar
centralized model. A centralized issuing authority would maintain a trusted
ledger on which transactions could be logged. DigiCash, eGold, and Venn
are (or were) examples of digital currencies issued by central authorities.65
Even those online digital currencies that were backed by some real
commodity, such as gold or carbon credits, still relied on a central authority
to maintain the register. Such registers were generally not public, and so
trust in the issuer was an absolute necessity for the currency to gain
widespread use. If trust in the issuer failed, for example, because the issuer
inflated the currency by simply issuing more of it, or because of a failure to
protect the ledger from hacks, the currency failed as well.
b. The Public Ledger Solution
A solution to the centralized authority problem was to make the ledger
public. Imagine an online list intended to track ownership of property
interests A, B, and C. At the start, perhaps Mary owns A, Joshua owns B,
62. Id.
63. See J.P. & G.T., supra note 52 (“In a centralised system, [theft is prevented] by clearing
transactions through a single database.”).
64. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 116 (describing the use of a distributed public ledger); About
Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://wwwuspto.gov/about-us (last visited Mar. 27, 2015);
Overview of the Copyright Office, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/about (last visited
Mar. 27, 2015).
65. See Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 7, at 819–20 (describing a number of non-Bitcoin
cryptocurrency and virtual currency implementations).
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and Maggie owns C. We record this original set of interests in the list. Each
time an interest changes hands, the ledger is updated, and the new list is
distributed to everyone. In this way, the ownership interest can cheaply
change hands with no need for a central authority.
Yet even with this extremely simplified system, there are several
problems. Suppose Mary wishes to convey her interest to Grace. How can
she do so, given that the two may not know each other, or may only be able
to communicate electronically? The answer lies in cryptography.66 Each
person within the property system has a pair of cryptographically related
keys, one public, given to everyone in the world to use, and one private,
held only by the individual.67 The keys are mathematically related, yet it is
not possible to use the public key to guess the private key.68 With the
public key, one can send messages, bitcoins, or anything else, in a way that
only the person with the private key can access. A commonly used analogy
is that of a letterbox. The public key is the address of the letterbox. Anyone
can put a letter in. But only the owner of the letterbox has the key to open it
and retrieve the contents.69
Cryptography therefore secures the transfer of ownership interests in
our simple online list. If Mary wishes to send her property interest to
Grace, she encrypts it using Grace’s public key and sends it. Only Grace
can receive and decrypt it. Mary has confidence that she has sent the
property to Grace, and Grace has confidence that no one else can access or
use what was sent to her. The use of cryptography prevents anyone from
standing in the middle of the transaction, since they cannot decrypt and
therefore access the transmitted property interest. It does not prevent
duplication or double spending, however. While Mary’s ability to send the
interest and receive payment is adequately protected by cryptography, there
is the further problem that Mary may try to double sell her interest to both
Grace and Hannah.
A log of transactions prevents double sales. If the log is up to date, a
subsequent transfer from Mary to Hannah would be rejected because the
record would show that Mary’s interest had already been transferred to
Grace. Trustless technology addresses the double-spending problem
through the block chain, the decentralized and public log of all transactions.
66. See CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN PELZL, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY: A TEXTBOOK FOR
STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 149–74 (2010) (discussing public-key cryptography).
67. J.P. & G.T., supra note 52. See also Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 23
(describing public and private key pairing in a Bitcoin transaction).
68. Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 117.
69. BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 31–32 (1996).
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For example, under the Bitcoin block chain protocol, transactions during a
ten-minute period of time70 are gathered by third parties (termed “miners”
for reasons explored below) into a discrete “block” of transactions.71 Once
the transactions in a given block of time are verifiably baked into the
overall list of transactions, they become the latest block of transactions in a
chain of such blocks, hence the term block chain. The block chain
constitutes a complete transaction history of all transfers of the asset (and,
indeed, all other assets recorded in the chain), going back to the creation or
original allocation of the asset.72 All transactions must be registered with
the chain and included in a block to transfer the interest.73 Anyone can
download the public ledger and thus see which keys hold which assets.
The significant innovation of the block chain lies in how blocks are
added to the transactional chain without relying on a central authority, a
process termed “mining.” Miners are computers that provide computing
resources to the network, and in turn, are rewarded through processing fees
or through a grant of new bitcoins entering the system.74 Miners do not
discover new units—to that extent, the analogy to gold miners is
misleading. Rather, miners do a lot of work to secure the system and are
paid a small amount in a distributed fashion for their contributions.75
Mining consists of guessing numbers.76 Imagine rolling a twentysided die. Each time someone rolls under a five, they get a reward. The
more people roll, the faster results under five are generated; if that’s
happening too quickly, the system can adjust so that only rolls under a
70. J.P. & G.T., supra note 52. The time per block is arbitrarily set by the creators of the
protocol, and the algorithm adjusts so that new blocks are opened at the same rate regardless of the
computing resources available to the network. New protocols, such as Litecoin, benefit from faster
block times, meaning that transactions clear more quickly. Ian Steadman, Wary of Bitcoin? A Guide to
Some
Other
Cryptocurrencies,
ARS
TECHNICA
(May
11,
2013,
6:51
AM),
http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/05/wary-of-bitcoin-a-guide-to-some-other-cryptocurrencies.
71. Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 24–25.
72. Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 118.
73. Id.
74. This is payment of processing fees by inflation. As new bitcoins enter the system, all prior
bitcoins decrease very mildly in value, to the benefit of the entity which receives the new coins. The
Bitcoin network in particular addresses this concern by creating a hard cap of 21 million bitcoins that
can ever exist and decreasing the rate of return in new bitcoins per block, so that eventually miners will
be paid entirely from small processing fees rather than by inflation of the overall system. But this is
essentially an advertising point for the system, which is meant to attract anti-inflationary monetary
theorists. The system could just as easily be designed with a constant and limited inflationary rate to
continue paying for mining through inflation. Id. at 119–21.
75. Id.
76. Thanks to Google engineer Mike Shick for providing this analogy in conversations at the
Digital Asset Transfer Authority Gala, and for his continuing kindness in describing the underlying
technology.
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three or under a two are rewarded. This kind of dice rolling appears to be,
and in fact is, a waste of resources. The dice rolling discovers nothing
worth discovering. But the dice rolling has one advantage. If the only way
to get a result is to roll, and if there is no way to simulate or falsify rolling,
then people have to roll the dice to play the game.
This is how the block chain works.77 Mining computers attempt to
guess a hash value.78 “A hash is a way of transforming an arbitrary amount
of data to a fixed size number.”79
[Thus,] a hash is not invertible (you can’t recover the data from the hash)
and a small change in the input data creates a large change in the hash
value. Miners search for hashes with particular characteristics (for
example, the number of leading zeroes) in the only way possible: by
taking the block and adding a random number to it, and then computing
the hash of the block plus the random number, and checking it for the
desired characteristics.80

The hash is unpredictable.81 No one can tell ahead of time what the
result of each try will be. The only way to do it is to guess repeatedly and
rapidly. The protocol then sets a number of zeroes that must appear at the
beginning of the resulting hash as a way of adjusting the problem difficulty.
As more computers join the network, the math problem that must be solved
to open a new block simply becomes more difficult. Of course, the analogy
has limits. The so-called dice rolled in the Bitcoin protocol have more sides
than there are atoms in the universe.82 But for purposes of this discussion,
the idea is that miners must roll dice until they get an arbitrarily difficult
result.
Each time a miner finds a hash that meets the threshold, that miner is
permitted to add a block to the chain. The miner has proven that it has done
the work necessary to find a solution. Hence, the process of securing a
block chain is called a “proof-of-work” system.83 Each block’s numerical
value (unrelated to its financial value) is linked to the value of the prior
block. In order to falsify the block chain, an attacker must do two difficult
77. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 118–19.
78. Id. at 118 n.49.
79. Thanks to Google engineer Nathaniel Fairfield for this analogy, suggested in comments to
the piece and used with permission.
80. Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 118 n.49.
81. Id.
82. Alex Gorale, Explaining the Math Behind Bitcoin, CRYPTOCOINSNEWS (Oct. 18, 2014, 11:44
AM), http://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/explaining-the-math-behind-bitcoin/.
83. Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money
Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529, 532 (2014).
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things. If the attacker wishes to change a past transaction, the attacker
must—alone!—win enough die rolls so that she outpaces the rest of the
system. That is, faking the past is prohibitively difficult because any
attacker would have to match the combined processing power of the entire
network over that period of time. And to continue the falsification moving
forward into the future, the attacker would have to make guesses faster than
the current block chain. The protocol accepts as true the block chain with
the greater computational difficulty.84 So an attacker would have to guess
more hashes faster or at a higher computational difficulty than the rest of
the currently functioning network.85
The result is a distributed public ledger of interests that is difficult to
falsify and that becomes harder to falsify as more computers are added to
the network. It would take hundreds of times the processing power of all of
the world’s top fifty supercomputers to accomplish that task. Keeping up
the deception would be like lifting an ever-increasing stack of cars just to
steal a hubcap. This new mix of security and decentralization is the reason
that public ledger technology has received so much attention from
entrepreneurs and innovators.
c. Network Effects and Vulnerabilities
The system is not without its vulnerabilities.86 The ability of a trustless
ledger to provide frictionless transactions is directly tied to its ability to
scale. As Marc Andreessen noted:
Bitcoin is a classic network effect, a positive feedback loop. The more
people who use Bitcoin, the more valuable Bitcoin is for everyone who
uses it, and the higher the incentive for the next user to start using the
technology. Bitcoin shares this network effect property with the
telephone system, the web, and popular Internet services like eBay and
Facebook.87
84. Although this is often expressed as the network preferring the longer block chain, that is not
always the case. Imagine a block chain made up of easier computational guesses—that chain could be
longer in terms of blocks than a shorter chain comprised of much more difficult computational guesses.
85. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 120 n.57 (stating that an “attacker would require fifty percent
of the processing power to disrupt the bitcoin network, an unlikely event”). More recent theories
indicate that a 33 percent stake would be enough to disrupt the currency. Samuel Gibbs, Bitcoin Could
Be Hijacked by “Selfish” Groups Causing Currency Collapse, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2013, 7:26 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/bitcoin-hijack-research-mining.
86. The means by which a trustless ledger might be compromised is beyond the scope of this
piece. Broadly, centralization is the primary threat. If too much of a network is concentrated in the
hands of any one group, then that group can subvert the network by brute force. It is also of course
possible to compromise the security of the exchanges, but this is a matter of general cybersecurity.
87. Andreessen, supra note 6.
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The network effect can propel a new technology to prominence and
widespread adoption, but it can also impede innovation. Inferior
technologies can defeat superior technologies by virtue of large and
established networks. Thus, for example, the market in desktop operating
systems is commonly held to have stagnated because of the large legacy
network of installed operating systems. Only with the advent of tablet and
smartphone operating systems was the installed base different enough to
permit a new and competitive network to grow.
The problem with network effects and innovation often stems from the
proprietary nature of the network. This is what prompts cries for antitrust
enforcement against companies that occupy a dominant network position in
an online market.88 When monopolists lock out competitors, the threat to
innovation is clear. However, the threat does not entirely, or even
predominantly, arise out of anticompetitive urges. Even in a decentralized
network, the value of the network grows non-linearly as a function of the
number of nodes in the network.89 Simply put, an innovator may need to
build on top of an existing network, rather than start her own network, even
if there is no anticompetitive entity seeking to lock her out.
As a result of this network effect, innovators will have great difficulty
establishing their own completely separate networks.
For this reason alone, new challengers to Bitcoin face a hard uphill
battle. If something is to displace Bitcoin now, it will have to have
sizable improvements and it will have to happen quickly. Otherwise, this
network effect will carry Bitcoin to dominance.90

Just as the existence of strong network effects provides a challenge to
innovators, innovators undermine already existing networks if they are
forced to build separate networks rather than building on what is already
available. For example, the attempt to establish separate block chains
undermines the security of the main Bitcoin block chain. The more
computers contribute processor cycles to the block chain by mining, the
more secure it is. If mining resources are divided between two networks,
both networks are weaker. Further, because security grows non-linearly as
a function of the number of nodes, both networks are significantly weaker
88. See generally STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS AND
MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999) (analyzing the Microsoft
antitrust case in the context of the high-speed software industry).
89. For example, Metcalfe’s Law posits that the value of a communications network grows as the
square of the number of nodes. See James Hendler & Jennifer Golbeck, Metcalfe’s Law, Web 2.0, and
the Semantic Web, 6 J. WEB SEMANTICS 14, 14 (2007).
90. Andreessen, supra note 6.
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than one network with double the resources would be. Baby block chains
are both a threat to the main block chain—since they take power that would
otherwise be available to that system and divert it—and are themselves
vulnerable, since they do not have the processing power to defend
themselves.
This is the current state of affairs. The current main Bitcoin block
chain resists falsification because it is the biggest network.91 A large
amount of processing power would need to be devoted to the block chain
over a significant period of time in order to falsify the public ledger. New
technologies and uses will be more secure if innovators can build them on
top of the Bitcoin block chain rather than starting afresh and attempting to
gather another network of computers. In a way, first adopters are the scarce
resource. Getting enough miners to join a new network detracts from the
prior network. If a full range of different and innovative applications could
be built on top of the same block chain, then each technology could benefit
from the strength and security of the combined mining for that chain.
Technologies built on top of the current Bitcoin block chain would take
shelter in the security of the current network, while being available for the
development of new uses.
2. Tokenized Property
Innovators who wish to implement property systems in a trustless
ledger might create their own network, separate from all others, and try to
make that network large and fast.92 They are likely to better succeed,
however, if they build property systems on top of existing networks. One
way to do so is by treating the slots in a public ledger not as coins, but as
tokens that represent a property interest.
Consider, for example, a group that wished to tokenize rights in
favors. So if A owes B a favor, B may wish to convey that favor to C, and
C to D, and so on. If the group wanted to expand the favor network to the
entire country, it could purchase a single bitcoin. Since bitcoins are
divisible to eight decimal places, the group then could divide that single
91. However, falsification is feasible, especially during technological paradigm shifts. For
example, the shift to application-specific integrated circuit mining led to a concentration of mining
power within the Bitcoin ecosystem, such that one mining group was, for a twelve hour span, able to
surpass the 51 percent mark. Joel Hruska, One Bitcoin group now controls 51% of total mining power,
threatening entire currency’s safety, EXTREMETECH (June 16, 2014, 10:43 AM),
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/184427-one-bitcoin-group-now-controls-51-of-total-miningpower-threatening-entire-currencys-safety.
92. See J.P. & G.T., supra note 52 (discussing how security in block chain technologies
consumes processing cycles and requires widespread adoption).
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coin up and issue one hundred million tokens—each one a single “satoshi,”
the smallest unit of bitcoin that can be tracked and traded.93 A satoshi
originating from the “favor” bitcoin would represent the favor. For a cost
ranging between $500 and $1000, the group could secure one hundred
million tokens that are tracked and protected by the full computing power
of the block chain.
There are efforts underway to build such systems on top of the Bitcoin
block chain.94 For example, a company might decide to convey ownership
of a commodity like gold by tying it to specific coins within the chain.95
The company may then arbitrarily designate coins that it owns as
“colored,” that is, as having some significance beyond the coin itself.96
This designation in no way impacts the rest of the block chain, which is in
fact oblivious to the additional meaning attached to the coins by the
company. Any coin traceable back to an original gold-colored coin takes on
the characteristics of the original coin. Whoever controls the coin, controls
the commodity. Multiple colors are of course possible, with each different
application resting on a different set of colored coins.
The more closely the conveyed interest is tied to the token, the more
effective token systems become. For example, assume that the interest
parties wished to convey was the ownership of the token itself. The public
ledger would accomplish that without any complexity. The person who has
the token in their digital wallet—that is, the person to whom the ledger
ascribes ownership—would hold the right.
There is only slight additional complexity for tracking intangible
rights distinct from, but connected to, the token. Consider a fantasy
baseball league in which participants trade “players” by ascribing to one
person within the league the right to use a particular real-world player’s
stats in determining the success of a virtual baseball team. Only one
participant within the league may count a player on their virtual team, per
the rules of the game. The resource is separate from the token. The token is
not the resource itself, but the token conveys the right in a public fashion,
so that participants in the system may know who may exercise the right.
Tying a token to a legal right is common in property law. For
93. Andreessen, supra note 6; Jim Kessler, John Vahey & Matthew Caulfield, Bitcoin: Back to
the Future, THIRD WAY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://thirdway.org/report/bitcoin-back-to-the-future.
94. See, e.g., Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin Reveals Ethereum at Bitcoin Miami 2014, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9dpjN3Mwps (discussing various uses for the
Bitcoin block chain).
95. Id. at 4:35.
96. Id. at 5:05, 8:20.
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example, while land itself cannot be conveyed in a ledger, it is legally
uncontroversial to tie the right to land to a token—a deed97—that can be
cheaply and quickly transferred, and that can be recorded in a ledger of
interests. If there is a dispute as to the ownership of a plot of land, courts
refer to the land records ledger, at least as a starting point.98 To give
another example, a stock certificate has no intrinsic value. The certificate
serves as a token that conveys certain rights; for example, the right to vote
or the right to receive dividends. From handing over the car keys as
symbolic delivery of a gift of personal property,99 to conveying ownership
in bulk commodities through warehouse receipts,100 to the ritual of livery of
seisin at common law, the law has long recognized the need to transfer
property interests through the expedient of a symbol, deed, or token.101
Token systems work well to transfer rival legal rights to exercise the
prerogatives of ownership over a given resource, whether in the form of a
stock certificate, oil or gas lease, land deed, copyright or patent registration,
or any other right dependent on a ledger entry. The question is not whether
those rights can be tokenized. They already are. The relevant question is
whether a trustless, public, and cryptographically secure ledger can provide
better tokens. Currently extant property transfer systems were originally
adopted because they offered better security, more certainty, and lower
costs than prior methods of property conveyance. In the same way, new
systems that improve security, certainty, and speed at reduced cost have the
potential to improve on legacy property systems.
Tokenized public ledgers offer new solutions to old property
problems. The tokens can be securely transferred for very little cost. A
97. Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 20 (2006).
98. Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W. 3d 615, 621 (Tex. 2012) (“Record title . . . typically refers to
legal evidence of a person’s ownership right in property.”). Compare United States v. Ellis, 739 F.2d
1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Illinois law defines the owner of an automobile as the person holding
title . . . .”), and Tusa v. Omaha Auto Auction, Inc., 712 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he
Nebraska Supreme Court held that there would not be an exception to the general rule that the title is
conclusive evidence of ownership where the titleholders voluntarily put their names on the title . . . .”),
with In re James, 496 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2013) (“[I]n Arkansas, certificate of title is only
evidence of title to a vehicle, not title itself.”).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2, cmt. g
(2003) (discussing symbolic delivery). Possession is used as the crudest proxy of all, but faute de mieux
has remained in widespread use. Willcox v. Stroup, 467 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2006).
100. Donald B. Pedersen, Electronic Data Interchange as Documents of Title for Fungible
Agricultural Commodities, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 719, 732–36 (1995).
101. See Frisch, supra note 50, at 531 (“To deal with the [problem of competing interests in
property], one finds a history rich in rules clothed in ceremonial garb. The play is everything: a transfer
occurs only if properly performed.”).
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block chain can trace transactions even where the number and speed of
such transactions would confound a regular recording system.102 Attempts
to double spend tokens are rapidly detected and resolved. Unlike many
property systems, where clouds on title resulting from double spending can
last for years, double sales within a public ledger are blocked within
minutes. Indeed, while the passage of time makes interests in traditional
property more obscure and less secure, the passage of even an hour builds a
transaction so firmly into the block chain that it cannot practically be
reversed or falsified.
3. Protocol Networks and Side-Chains
Enthusiasts and entrepreneurs have proposed a range of improvements
to public ledger technologies.103 Some of the best ideas address how the
protocol can support uses beyond simple currency simulation. Thus, for
example, one innovative proposal is to use the block chain as a
communications protocol on top of which anything can be built, rather than
merely a currency with some alternative uses through tokenization. This
approach uses a Turing-complete programming language to permit users to
create any program, riding on top of a decentralized block chain, rather
than riding on top of a traditional database.104 The functional entity within
the proposed new system is a “contract”—a software agent that resides
within the block chain and commands resources from that chain.105 For
example, parties might set up a very simple hedging contract, in which both
parties put one thousand dollars’ worth of trustless currency in, and the
hedging party would, at the end of the contract, receive one thousand
dollars’ worth of currency back, hedging the risk against downward market
volatility but granting upside gains to the other party.106
Networks built to service a range of applications offer significant
advantages over networks built for a single use case. For example, treating
the block chain as a communications protocol would open trustless public
ledgers to more advanced property applications. It may well be that the
existing main block chain needs to be reworked in order to serve as an
effective underlying protocol for the broader range of applications that
startups are now considering. Yet there is a cost each time for doing so, and
102. See Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 21 n.4 (“[A]ll Bitcoin transactions are
recorded and can . . . be traced.”).
103. See generally Ethereum, supra note 94 (discussing various implementations for the Bitcoin
block chain).
104. Id. at 9:15.
105. Id. at 6:28.
106. Id. at 6:46.
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it is entirely possible that at some point, the network benefits of an existing
public ledger will be sufficiently high that starting over is not an option. In
short, there must be another way to innovate in public ledger technology
besides starting the network over each time.
Another innovation, called a “side-chain,” may make it possible to
leverage the strongest existing public ledger for new and innovative
applications, without requiring those technologies to start over and build
entirely new networks.107 In a side-chain, the creators of an innovative
technology root a new block chain in the main Bitcoin block chain through
Bitcoin contracts, which permit the automated exchange of the sidechain
currency back into the main block chain.
Consider a company that wishes to develop a new, faster block chain.
The company cannot merely create tokens based on the main Bitcoin block
chain, since those new transactions will only be processed at the speed of
the main chain—one block every ten minutes. Instead, the company might
create a new and faster block chain, but one that is grounded in and
convertible to the main block chain through preprogrammed Bitcoin
contracts. If the new currency flops because, for example, the innovation is
not attractive to users, then those users who did invest in the alternative
currency can convert their holdings back into Bitcoins on the main block
chain. Side-chains therefore significantly reduce the cost of innovation.
Tokenizations and side-chains each offer the possibility of building a
large range of applications on top of a single, powerful block chain. While
diverse applications built on the same network spur growth and innovation,
the multiplicity of interconnected use cases presents a serious problem for
regulators. The following section discusses a number of the different
emerging use cases for block chain technologies, as well as some of the
currently developing regulatory responses.
C. USE CASES AND REGULATORY REGIMES
The regulatory framework that will govern trustless public ledgers is a
function of the narrative surrounding them. Technologies are created by
narratives, and they are regulated by narratives.108 Bitcoin is as much
107. Jon Evans, Bitcoin 2.0: Unleash the Sidechains, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2014),
http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/19/bitcoin-2-0-unleash-the-sidechains.
108. See DAVID E. NYE, AMERICA AS SECOND CREATION: TECHNOLOGY AND NARRATIVES OF
NEW BEGINNINGS 4–11 (2013) (detailing America’s “technological foundation story”); Steven Wilf,
The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
139, 175–76 (2008) (revealing the conflict between two narratives of intellectual property’s industrial
pluralism in the New Deal); Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle
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driven by a social narrative as it is by innovative technology.109 That
narrative springs from a driving need for online global currency, from a
sense of technological optimism, and from the still-vibrant story that
groups can solve their own problems, given low enough transaction
costs.110 This narrative has fueled a range of powerful alternatives to
traditional and costly financial structures and payment networks.111
Conversely, the narrative of criminal uses for online currencies has fueled
the regulatory push that has overtaken them.112
Cryptocurrencies can be used to transfer value, even if they are not
currency per se.113 Because of this, regulators are currently examining
Bitcoin and like cryptocurrencies almost purely from the perspective of
financial services regulation.114 The danger is that this could imperil
innovations built on top of the block chain that do not fit a financial
services model.115
While the financial narrative is well established online, the property
narrative has a much more tenuous foothold. The technological tools are
already in place to push trustless technologies well beyond their
cryptocurrency implementation. The current need is for a legal and social
narrative that can, when combined with extant technology, provoke similar
development and innovation in other value-transfer systems.
Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1645 (2007) (“For [American jurists], patents were not a vestige of
corrupt political maneuvering, but instead represented the flourishing of a vital, energetic young
nation.”); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 561 (1998) (discussing how one narrative of DRM technology
may have limited innovation in the field); Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1752–53 (1988) (examining the narrative behind regulatory takings).
109. David Groshoff, Kickstarter My Heart: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness
of Crowdfunding Constraints and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 489, 511–22 (2014).
110. Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency, SSRN 1
(May 8, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294124 (stating that the creators of
Bitcoin believed that “currency and economic activity can arise spontaneously without centralized
authority . . . .”).
111. See, e.g., Groshoff, supra note 109, at 509–10 (describing one of the first virtual currencies,
DigiCash, and the impact its failure had on cryptocurrencies).
112. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 167–69 (discussing the current push for regulation of
Bitcoin).
113. See Farmer, supra note 7, at 104 (arguing that Bitcoin should not be classified as a currency
or security, but as “something new”).
114. See Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 7, at 814–20 (discussing various federal and state
actions addressing Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies); Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at
13–18, 33–45 (creating a categorization scheme for virtual currencies and describing the emerging
European regulatory framework for such currencies, including the potential applicability of a range of
European financial services laws).
115. See Farmer, supra note 7, at 104 (arguing that treating Bitcoin as either a currency or security
will cause problems).

2015]

BITPROPERTY

831

It is worth briefly examining the emerging regulatory framework
surrounding cryptocurrencies for two reasons. First, it is useful to get a
sense as to how the features of a given use case drive the regulatory
response. Second, the financial regulatory response is very likely to
become tangled with new, non-currency use cases for public ledgers as
they emerge. This section explores the ways in which cryptocurrency and
alternative use cases have become tangled as a matter of regulatory focus.
The following subparts look first at the regulatory regime currently
governing trustless system architectures before turning to a discussion of
the property use cases that trustless public ledgers enable.
1. Currency and Payments
Currency, or a substitute thereof,116 is the most prominent current use
case for trustless architectures. The Internet has long needed something that
can serve as a decentralized unit of account, store of value, and medium of
exchange. Trustless public ledgers work well as currency substitutes
because conveyance of the ledger entry is a transfer of the asset itself. In
currency systems, the transferor is not trying to transfer something else by
using the unit of cryptocurrency as a symbol for that other thing. The
transferor merely transfers the unit by transferring the ledger entry.117 A
trustless public ledger serves that purpose simply and admirably.
Cryptocurrency also answers a market need for online cash
equivalents. Cryptocurrencies improve on the traditional system of cash,
checks, and cards. Traditional currencies are not sufficiently divisible so as
to enable the kind of micropayments necessary for many Internet
transactions,118 and the transfer networks for cash through the financial
system are too expensive for transactions of only a few cents to be worth
transferring.119 Cryptocurrencies enable long-distance, low-trust, and lowcost microtransactions.
Regulators have chosen to regulate cryptocurrency businesses under
the payments regulatory framework. This is because, in addition to serving
as a currency substitute, ledgers also serve as payment systems: a method
of settling debts and transferring value from one person to another. Thus,
116. The terms “currency substitute” and “cryptocurrency” are used to denote the fact that while
cryptocurrencies are not currencies or money as defined by law, they are still captured under a range of
statutes that regulate transmission of value. See infra Part I.C.1.a.
117. See J.P. & G.T., supra note 52 (describing how bitcoins are transferred).
118. For example, microtransactions are a common means of selling high volumes of low-dollarvalue digital items in video games or social networks.
119. Grinberg, supra note 7, at 170.
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the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”)
has
spearheaded
regulatory
efforts
surrounding
cryptocurrencies. FinCEN has the authority to regulate money services
businesses (“MSBs”) and issue implementing regulations under the Bank
Secrecy Act.120 FinCEN’s approach has been to deem cryptocurrencies a
kind of “value that substitutes for currency,” such that businesses
conducting transfers using cryptocurrency may be drawn into the definition
of a regulated MSB under the Act.121
Under FinCEN regulations, an MSB is a non-bank, non-depository
institution that engages in one of an enumerated list of financial services,
from check cashing to issuing prepaid access.122 MSBs do not include
banks, businesses regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or any person who engages
in one of the enumerated financial services “on an infrequent basis and not
for gain or profit.”123 Perhaps the broadest sub-category of MSBs is that of
money transmitters.124 This category includes entities that engage in “the
acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency
from one person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value
that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means,”125
or even more loosely, “[a]ny other person engaged in the transfer of
funds.”126
120. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting (Bank Secrecy) Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1829b, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951–1959, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5311–5322 (2012)) (granting the Department of the Treasury the power to implement regulations
under this act); 31 U.S.C. § 310(a) (establishing FinCEN as a bureau within the Department of the
Treasury); Treas. Order 180-01 (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/role-oftreasury/orders-directives/Pages/to180-01.aspx (delegating enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act to
FinCEN); FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
121. The hook to virtual currencies lies in the inclusion of “other value that substitutes for
currency” within the FinCEN regulations. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2012).
122. Id. § 1010.100(ff).
123. Id. §§ 1010.100(ff)(8)(i)–(iii).
124. Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5).
125. Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A).
126. Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(B). Typical of complex and repeatedly amended statutory schemes,
additional and potentially conflicting mentions of money transmission appear elsewhere in the Code.
For example, for purposes of determining which entities must register with the Secretary of the
Treasury, 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012) defines a “money transmitting business” as “any other person who
engages as a business in the transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in
an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating
the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions
system,” and that is not a depositary institution, which is required to file reports under 31 U.S.C.
§ 5313. That statute in turn provides guidelines for reporting domestic coin and currency transactions.
31 U.S.C. § 5313.
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An MSB must comply with a range of registration, record-keeping,
and reporting requirements, including know-your-customer obligations and
suspicious financial activity reporting.127 An entity that fails to do so faces
regulatory sanctions, as well as potential criminal liability under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1960 for the operation of an “unlicensed money transmitting business.”128
Section 1960 defines an unlicensed money transmitting business to include
“a money transmitting business which affects interstate or foreign
commerce in any manner or degree and . . . otherwise involves the
transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to
have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to
promote or support unlawful activity.”129 The statute provides for fines and
imprisonment for up to five years.130
The definitions of “money transmitting business,”131 “money
transmitter,”132 and “unlicensed money transmitting business”133 in the
regulations and criminal statute have created a regulatory thicket that has
caught multiple issuers of online currency. United States v. e-Gold, Ltd.134
considered whether the issuer of an online currency operated an unlicensed
money transmitting business despite the fact that it did not deal in statebacked currency.135 The court held that the definition of “money
transmitting business” in 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (the criminal statute) was
substantially broader than that found under the Bank Secrecy Act or its
implementing regulations, and as a result, held that any unlicensed
transmission of money on behalf of the public “by any and all means” was
a criminal act.136 Thus, for example, in May 2013, the founder and
operators of electronic currency system Liberty Reserve were indicted on
money laundering and unlicensed money transmission charges for
operating an online virtual currency network heavily used by criminal
organizations.137 The breadth of application of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 seems
only limited by the idea that an entity must engage in money transmission
127. Id. § 5330.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1).
129. Id. §§ 1960(b)(1)(a)–(c).
130. Id. § 1960(a).
131. 31 U.S.C. § 5330(a)(1).
132. 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A)–(B) (2012).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a).
134. United States v. e-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2008).
135. Id. at 88.
136. Id. at 90. See also Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 7, at 822–28 (analyzing the e-Gold
prosecution and its implications for subsequent cryptocurrencies).
137. Sealed Indictment ¶¶ 30–32, United States v. Liberty Reserve S.A., No. 13 Cr. 368 (S.D.N.Y.
May 28, 2013); Kim Zetter, Liberty Reserve Founder Indicted on $6 Billion Money-Laundering
Charges, WIRED (May 28, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/05/liberty-reserve-indicted/.
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as a business, or at least in more than an isolated fashion. For example, the
e-Gold court noted: “Section 1960 was designed to tackle large-scale
operations as opposed to small-scale or individual money transmitters.”138
Or, as the court in United States v. Velastegui139 noted, “section 1960(a)
requires that the unlicensed entity be ‘an illegal money transmitting
business’ . . . which insures that persons or entities cannot be prosecuted
for a single, isolated transmission of money.”140
It was against this backdrop that FinCEN issued guidance in mid-2013
that defined the application of FinCEN’s regulations to persons
administering, exchanging, or using virtual currencies, with the goal of
clarifying when businesses or individuals would be subject to regulation.141
That guidance differentiates between “users,” “administrators,” and
“exchangers” for purposes of determining who must comply with the Bank
Secrecy Act provisions falling under FinCEN’s ambit. An “administrator”
is an entity that issues or controls a virtual currency. A “user” under the
guidance is “a person that obtains virtual currency to purchase goods or
services.”142 An “exchanger” is “a person engaged as a business in the
exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other virtual
currency.”143 Despite FinCEN’s efforts to clarify, there remains significant
confusion regarding which entities are users and which are exchangers. In a
trade, one person gives, and the other receives. Thus, for example, a “user”
can generally only “obtain virtual currency,” as defined by the guidance,
through the “exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other
currency”—the very definition of an exchanger.144 As a result of this
confusion, many startups are uncertain whether they must seek licensing as
money transmitters, and many individual users are worried that they may
be subject to sanction.
2. Property
Thus far, this section has addressed the regulation of cryptocurrencies
as a payment rail. The technology is not limited to use as a payment
system, however. Trustless public ledgers are value transfer systems, part
138. e-Gold, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 90.
139. United States v. Velastegui, 199 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 1999).
140. Id. at 595 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2012)).
141. Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using
Virtual Currencies, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK 1 (Mar. 18, 2013),
http:// fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
142. Id. at 2–3.
143. Id. at 2.
144. Id.
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of what commenters call the “Internet of Value.”145 Block chains can
facilitate the transfer of more than mere coins. Trustless technology can
disintermediate any system that ties an identity to a resource by making
transfers of the resource to new identities reasonably secure, public, and
low-cost. This makes it an intriguing technology upon which to base
property registries. To date, however, property and commodity conceptions
of block chain technologies are undertheorized and incomplete.
The costs of getting property theory wrong are significant. Clean
property rules should reduce information costs. Unfortunately, the Internal
Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) attempt to treat virtual currency as property for
tax purposes does not. In 2014, the IRS published a notice regarding tax
treatment of cryptocurrencies.146 Those rules grew out of the IRS’s prior
experience with virtual assets in games and social networks, especially
game currency or social network currency.147 Such assets could be used or
traded for other digital assets within a virtual environment.148 Thus, for
example, one might use the virtual gold in an online world to buy a coveted
item or piece of virtual real estate. In a social network, a user might be
willing to pay a small amount to decorate a social network page, or to send
a small gift to a friend through the network.149
The first virtual currencies were initially restricted in scope precisely
because their value was grounded in a specific environment.150 One could
only use virtual gold to buy items or assets in the virtual world that
generated them.151 Yet by the very fact that those currencies commanded
assets that people deeply desired, the value of the currencies began to
spread beyond the virtual worlds or social networks in which they
originated.152 Just as dollars are used in transactions entirely outside of the
145. Stan Higgins, Money 20/20 Day 2: Automated Economies and the Internet of Value,
COINDESK (Nov. 4, 2014, 6:46 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/money2020-day-two-2014/.
146. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (Mar. 25, 2014), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
147. See Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 11 (“In connection with the high penetration
of the internet, there has also been a proliferation of virtual communities in recent years. . . . In some
cases, these virtual communities have created and circulated their own digital currency for exchanging
the goods and services they offer, thereby creating a new form of digital money . . . .”).
148. See, e.g., id. at 14–15 (describing virtual currencies in Facebook and Second Life).
149. Id.
150. For example, WebMoney, e-Gold, Pecunix, and Liberty Reserve are digital currencies that
are based on or backed by the price of gold. See generally Peter C. Tucker, The Digital Currency
Doppelganger: Regulatory Challenge or Harbinger of the New Economy?, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 589 (2009).
151. Leah Shen, Who Owns the Virtual Items?, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 1–2 (2010).
152. Peter M. J. Gross, A History of Virtual Currency: Why Bitcoins Shouldn’t Surprise You, CFA
INST. (Jan. 10, 2014), http://annual.cfainstitute.org/2014/01/10/a-history-of-virtual-currency-why-
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United States, virtual currencies also began to command value outside of
their worlds or networks of origin. Chinese citizens began using Q-coins, a
social network currency, to purchase everyday goods and services.153
Players of multi-million-player online games began to start businesses in
which they generated virtual gold not to play the games, but for the purpose
of selling the gold for dollars.154
As early as 2007, the IRS was aware of the potential for tax avoidance
through virtual property and virtual currencies.155 If virtual assets could be
converted to real dollars and back, then ordinary assets could be hidden in
virtual worlds and payments could be made without showing any gain in
income. The critical question was how to treat virtual assets that might be
used purely for play purposes, but which also could be easily sold to other
players to turn a profit.156
This tension caused the IRS to hesitate to issue formal guidance. The
IRS settled instead in 2009 on an informal cash-out rule that looked
something like the rules for realization of gain upon disposition of
property, or capital gains.157 If the digital property merely increased in
value within the virtual environment, no tax liability accrued. As such,
when users increased their virtual holdings, or their virtual holdings
otherwise increased in value, they incurred no tax liability. If, however,
users exchanged virtual assets for dollars, they were liable for the income
generated as a result. This system protected the broad range of users who
were simply playing games or purchasing assets within online
communities, as users who kept their assets and transactions virtual paid no
tax. This was not a significant concern because almost all such assets
needed to be exchanged for dollars before purchasing other assets.
bitcoins-shouldnt-surprise-you/.
153. Central Bank Threatens to Step into “Virtual Money” Controversy, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
(Nov. 16, 2006, 10:35 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/16/content_5337155.htm
(discussing Q-coin use in China).
154. Richard Scott, The Business End of Playing Games, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2007, 2:55 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6592335.stm.
155. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL
IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 15 (2013) [hereinafter GAO VEC REPORT].
156. See Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (arguing that only those who convert virtual items to cash should be taxed on that
income); Leandra Lederman, “Stranger than Fiction:” Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1620,
1622–24 (2007) (discussing whether receiving online game items should be taxed when only some
users sell them for profit); Jacqui Cheng, The Taxman Cometh? IRS Urged to Tax Virtual Worlds,
Economies, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 12, 2009, 11:04 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2009/2009/01/
taxpayer-advocate-urges-irs-to-tax-economy-in-virtual-worlds/.
157. GAO VEC REPORT, supra note 155, at 1–2.
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The tenor of the conversation shifted as virtual currencies outgrew
their origin in games, virtual worlds, and social networks. In 2013, the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report to the Senate
Committee on Finance on potential tax treatment for virtual economies and
currencies.158 The GAO report detailed how the IRS could address tax
treatment of currencies and assets obtained and used within virtual worlds,
social networks, or games.159 The report noted that while some economies
used virtual currencies “as a medium of exchange for goods and services”
within an online environment, such assets “can have economic value
outside of virtual economies” when traded for dollars.160 Moreover, the
report noted more recent currencies that “have been developed outside of
virtual economies as alternatives to government-issued currencies.”161
Following the GAO report, the IRS issued guidance determining that
“[f]or federal tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as property,”162 and
as a result, “[g]eneral tax principles applicable to property transactions
apply.”163 Yet unlike in the game context, where quasi-property treatment
protected most users who never cashed out from tax liability, the IRS’s
inelegant election to treat cryptocurrency as property raises transaction and
information costs. With each exchange of currency, the user must calculate
gain or loss based on the rise and fall of the cryptocurrency against the
dollar. Not only must a taxpayer who receives virtual currency as payment
include it in computing gross income, but the taxpayer must also calculate
the gain or loss upon exchange of virtual currency for other property.164
The IRS’s property characterization directly impacts Bitcoin’s use as a
medium of exchange.165 Based on the guidance, Bitcoin is taxed based on
the market rise or fall in its value during the period of time that the owner
held it.166 If the going rate for a Bitcoin was $500 per coin when a
consumer received .01 of a coin in the morning, and $750 per coin when
that consumer used that same amount to buy a sandwich and drink at lunch,
she would have realized $2.50 worth of taxable gain in the intervening
hour. Treating convertible virtual currency as undifferentiated personal
158. Id. at 1.
159. Id. at 1–2.
160. Id. at 1.
161. Id.
162. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 146.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. (“If the fair market value of property received in exchange for virtual currency
exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis of the virtual currency, the taxpayer has taxable gain.”).
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property poses a non-trivial threat to the use of the currency at the low end
of the microtransactions scale. The requirement to calculate base value and
gain on every receipt and expenditure made using convertible virtual
currency significantly raises transaction costs.167
In sum, new technology raises the possibility for near-frictionless and
reasonably secure disintermediated property exchange. But careful theory
is needed if the benefits of these systems and their successor technologies
are to be realized. The risk is that inelegantly conceived property systems
will complicate trades by raising information costs. The following part
therefore draws heavily on the established literature of information cost
theory in property to develop a framework for understanding the role of
good property rules in reducing information costs, and the proper design
parameters for digital property systems in light of that role.
II. BITPROPERTY
The preceding part discussed digital systems that might significantly
improve upon current methods of tracking and transferring property
interests. This part starts a conversation about the future of property. In
doing so, it seeks to address the mystery of digital property: why do we
truly own so little online? Why has traditional (i.e., non-intellectual)
property law failed to gain a real foothold in digital environments? What
conceptual blocks remain in place, preventing the full adoption of online
property regimes? And what can be done within the realm of theory to
begin to shift the conversation?
The core common law areas have taken markedly different paths in
their transition to online environments. Contract law has made an effortless
transition to the Internet.168 Electronic contracts are everywhere and
routinely enforced. Tort law has made a similarly seamless transition.169
Cyberdefamation is a routine cause of action, and specific online issues like
cyberbullying or revenge porn are hotly discussed topics, where progress in
the debate can be discerned.170
167. See Kashmir Hill, How I Paid My Bitcoin Taxes, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014, 2:26 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/04/15/how-i-paid-my-bitcoin-taxes/
(discussing
the
burdens of recordkeeping for Bitcoin transactions).
168. Rachel S. Conklin, Be Careful What You Click for: An Analysis of Online Contracting, 20
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 325, 329–30 (2008).
169. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV.
335, 344–49 (2005) (“Instituting website liability for illegal postings has the potential to jumpstart the
field of cybertorts so that it can develop into an effective social control mechanism for cyberspace.”).
170. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds Govern Everyday
Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 93–94 (2012) [hereinafter Fairfield, Mixed Reality] (“Such
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Yet traditional property law has struggled to find secure footing
online.171 Traditional property, a system designed through a long tradition
of common-law deliberation to govern interests in scarce and rival
resources, did not seem at the time of the rise of the Internet to be
immediately applicable to an environment in which many resources were
neither scarce nor rival. At that time, the critical application of Internet
technologies seemed to be unlimited duplication of non-scarce and nonrival information, rather than the frictionless transfer of scarce and rival
resources. As a result, intellectual property, the law governing non-rival
resources, became the dominant structure for online assets. Yet this
structure is enormously inefficient for those who prefer to own rather than
license.
For example, a consumer who purchases CDs owns the CDs but does
not own the MP3s of the same music. Consumers do not own the e-books
they purchase from Amazon Kindle, even though they would own the same
books purchased in physical form. Property rights in physical copies of
copyrighted material are utterly non-controversial. Property rights in digital
copies of copyrighted material drift in a limbo of digital rights management
technologies (“DRM”) and end user license agreements.172 No one can
accuse intellectual property of being under-examined. Not so with the law
of digital, rival property.
Traditional property law has long leveraged the physicality of assets
as a proxy for the rivalrousness that buyers and sellers demand in property
systems. The reason that one owns a table rather than purely licensing it
from its creator is that the table’s physicality makes it (for the most part)
rival. It is easier to buy a table from someone than to duplicate it through
copying. But, while physicality has been a proxy for necessary
rivalrousness, it is only a proxy. What is necessary is that property be rival,
not that property be physical. Ledgers provide the necessary rivalrousness
with no requirement of physicality. Yet the rough dividing line between
property and intellectual property law remains the false boundary of
physicality.
reputational harms can already be found in the purely online context.”).
171. See Elizabeth Townsend Gard & Rachel Goda, The Fizzy Experiment: Second Life, Virtual
Property and a 1L Property Course, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 915, 931–34
(2008) (discussing an example of the struggle to apply traditional property law to the online digital
environment).
172. See Fairfield, Mixed Reality, supra note 170, at 100–01 (explaining that there is a trend
towards corporate control, which increases the risk that “‘virtual’ rights holders (IP owners) will prevail
and that ‘real’ rights holders (real people and owners of physical property) will lose out”).
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There have been previous attempts at creating theory bridging the
physicality divide in property law, but these approaches have not fared
well. For example, the specific literature on cyberproperty attempted to tie
online property rights to offline chattel property rather than create digital
assets that are rivalrous in their own right.173 Under cyberproperty theory,
if I can legally prevent someone from entering my house or interfering with
my use of my car, I ought to be able to exclude someone from the physical
property consisting of my computer server. By extension, therefore, the
cyberproperty literature asks whether a business can extend its property
interest in its physical servers to a quasi-property right, enabling it to
exclude users from electronically accessing that server.174 For example, a
company might raise a cybertrespass claim to exclude unpermitted access
that generates high load on the company’s servers.175
Cyberproperty has not been broadly successful as a theory.176
Ownership of physical hardware has nothing to do with the information
that is stored on those servers.177 The owners of the two interests are almost
173. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 88 (2003) (discussing
“whether technological changes could ever lead us to abandon the presumption that a deliberate trespass
counts as a private wrong,” and arguing that this rule offers insufficient protection against “electronic
snooping”); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164–78 (2004) (exploring
“how the law should treat legal claims by owners of Internet-connected computer systems to enjoin
unwanted uses of their systems”); Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 23–43
(2007) (examining the history and development of cyberproperty); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser,
Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (focusing on the
debate over property rules in the technology law context); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 459, 470 (2006) (noting that there is an “overlap between contract claims and concepts of
property”); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 521 (2003) (“Instead of
concluding that cyberspace is outside of the physical world, courts are increasingly using the
cyberspace as place metaphor to justify application of traditional laws governing real property to this
new medium.”); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of
an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 586–87 (2001) (analogizing website addresses
and real property); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace As Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 445 (2003) (“The application of the cyberspace as place metaphor within the
criminal system is neatly reflected in the application, within the civil sphere, of the tort of ‘trespass to
chattels’ in cyberspace.”).
174. See sources cited supra note 173.
175. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003) (ruling on a claim of trespass
filed by Intel against a former employee who sent mass emails using Intel’s email system and
determining that email communications that did not substantially impair the function of Intel’s system
did not constitute trespass to chattel).
176. See Lastowka, supra note 173, at 53 (“[L]ocating those property rights exclusively in the
hands of chattel owners is not efficient.”).
177. See, e.g., Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 20, at 1052–57 (discussing types of virtual
property, all of which have nothing to do with physical hardware); Edward Lee, Warming Up to UserGenerated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1499 (2008) (explaining the proliferation of usergenerated content).
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never the same. Most servers are now virtual. Information is constantly in
motion between server farms located in completely different parts of the
world.178 The servers are often maintained by third parties.179 Digital
resources are no longer tied to any particular physical asset from which a
property interest might be bootstrapped.180 The attempt to do so merely
privileges those few companies that still maintain their own server farms.
The limits of cyberproperty theory demonstrate the need for wellconceived online property systems. There is every reason to believe that the
degree of rivalrousness created by trustless public ledgers can restore the
balance between intellectual and traditional property online. In a block
chain, a slot in the ledger cannot be copied and cannot be duplicated. In
solving the double-spending problem, trustless public ledgers offer a
solution to the copying dilemma that has so hounded online property
interests. The difficulty is that the technology has developed late, after a
hybrid contract and intellectual property regime has become broadly
accepted as governing even discrete and rival digital assets.
Done well, digital property could serve as a mainstay for consumer
rights online.181 Badly theorized digital property rules will not empower
new owners in new spaces, but will merely act as a tool for extracting the
benefits of the online environment for those with greater bargaining
power.182 Bad online property regimes increase information and other
transaction costs and intensify unequal bargaining relationships. Compare,
for example, the difference in bargaining power between Amazon and
Kindle customers under the current anemic property regime for e-books
with the relationship that would exist if customers held enforceable
ownership rights in their book collections. Under the current regime,
Amazon’s power to revoke a person’s entire online library in the event of a
licensing dispute is merely a modernized version of the core
unconscionability at issue in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.183
178. See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 577, 635 (2003) (“Many copyright owners . . . will make regular backup copies of their works and
store multiple backup copies in different locations.”).
179. See Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 20, at 1081–82.
180. See sources cited supra note 177.
181. See Peter Lyman, The Article 2B Debate and the Sociology of the Information Age, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1079 (1998) (“While the Article 2B debate focuses on the rights of the
owners of digital property, it pays little attention to consumers’ use of information, consumers’ rights,
and consumers’ access to possible sources of economic power.”).
182. See Bob Wright, Technology and the Rule of Law in the Digital Age, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 705, 708 (2005) (“[T]he economic argument against digital theft . . . ––as
compelling as it is to business leaders––is remarkably ineffectual with the public.”).
183. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 250 F.2d 445, 448–49 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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What is obvious unconscionability when applied to personal property
escapes notice when structured as an intellectual property license.
Additional theory is necessary to support a shift from the current
hybrid contract and intellectual property regime to one that recognizes
clean digital property interests.184 The advent of block chain technology
creates an opportunity to engage in this much-needed conceptual work.
This part therefore offers a potential conceptual reboot for online property.
It asserts that there is a serious need for robust online property interests that
are neither tangible nor intellectual property. It offers a new view of
property interests that may provide a more promising foundation for the
future development of digital property law.
A. PROPERTY AS A LAW OF INFORMATION
Property has been variously conceptualized as the fruits of labor,185 a
means of anchoring personal identity,186 or a way to maximize social
184. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 133 (“Despite the fact that the way
persons communicate and do business has changed dramatically in the past fifteen years, we still lack
an adequate vocabulary with which to describe intangible assets. With changes in business inevitably
come changes in property rights and the business changes that developed with the growth of the Internet
have similarly created a demand for new property rights.”).
185. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 301 (1988)
(“[A]lthough one cannot physically possess or occupy ideas, property in ideas is justified because
people ‘have the right to enjoy the fruits of their labor, even when the labors are intellectual.’”); Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (“[O]ther courts have extended common law
protection to intangibles on the Locke-like ground that no entity should ‘reap where it has not sown.’”);
Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal Tradition: Rethinking
the Modern Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L.J. 723, 739 (1990) (discussing Locke’s labor theory of value);
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent,
and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1388–89 (1989) (“Many theorists, including John
Locke, have attempted to justify dominion over property as an out-growth of rights over one’s personal
self, and an argument of that sort might also be used to justify intellectual property.”); Julie E. Cohen,
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1381–82
(2000) (discussing the distinction between a labor-desert theory of property and a utilitarian theory);
Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517,
517–22 (1990) (“If, as Locke intimated, labor were all that was necessary to give a person a natural
right of property in an unowned object, then perhaps an individual’s labor would be sufficient to make
the ocean her private property.”); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1215 (1998) (“[P]roperty rights can and should be shaped so as to help foster
the achievement of a just and attractive culture.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech,
Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 665, 676 (1992) (explaining that Locke’s theories had “a powerful effect in intellectual property
and did much to legitimate the belief that ownership rights in speech originated deep in natural law and
resounded with moral authority”).
186. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
(exploring the relationship between property and identity); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,
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welfare through efficient allocation of resources in markets.187 Each
approach has had significant explanatory power for some property interests
in some contexts. Yet no currently extant theory has provided an adequate
foundation for bringing the virtues and values of property to the Internet.188
Grant Gilmore stated the problem succinctly: “Even for a lawyer, the ‘what
is property?’ problem presents no difficulty when you are dealing with
goods, chattels, things: if you can see it, count, weigh and measure it, it
exists; if you can’t, it doesn’t. But intangible claims are another matter
entirely.”189 The consequences of the failure of property theory to
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852, 1903–36 (1987) (discussing market-inalienability based on a
conception of personhood or “human flourishing”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1240–44 (1996) (discussing personal identity as a justification for broad
copyright protection); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49
DUKE L.J. 383, 488 (1999) (“As we have seen, . . . a Kantian right of publicity can be more expansively
conceptualized as a property right grounded in human freedom . . . . It is true that enforcing publicity
rights represents a value judgment that objectifications of personal identity constitute private
property.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1485 (1989)
(“Such a ‘personhood’ approach would hold that the opportunity to exchange rights for benefits
wrongly commodifies rights. Especially when the government benefit comes in the form of money, but
even when it is in kind, the condition attaches a price to the right surrendered—a value in exchange.”);
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 364 (1989) (discussing a personal right to privacy); C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to
Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 747 (1986) (“The personhood function of
property is to protect people’s control of the unique objects and the specific spaces that are intertwined
with their present and developing individual personality or group identity.”); Justin Hughes, “Recoding”
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 924 (1999) (“In the last
few years, this generally pro-property personhood theory has been met with a scholarly reply specific to
intellectual property: that owners’ rights to control their intellectual property are really rights about who
controls social meaning.”).
187. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 44 (2004) (“An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility . . . when the
tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it”
(quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 12–
13 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970))); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1222–23 (1999) (“[W]hen resources are wasted in a tragedy of
the anticommons, protecting fragments of ownership does not serve the plausible economic goals of a
private property regime.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001) (discussing the “rise of the view among modern legal
economists that property is simply a list of use rights in particular resources”); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347–48 (1996) (discussing copyright’s
importance to democratic civil society); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1867 (2007) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The Morality of
Property] (discussing morality and property rights); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and
Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 102, 142–
43 (1997).
188. John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics)
of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 82–83 (2011).
189. Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 132 (quoting Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What
It Does Not Do for the Future, 26 LA. L. REV. 300, 301 (1966)).
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adequately account for rival and intangible property interests have been
significant: an online ecosystem in which consumers control little and own
even less.
This section proposes to bridge the physicality divide in property law
by asserting that property rights are best understood as information and that
property systems are ones in which the form of the property as well as the
means of its transfer are methods of conveying information. This section as
a whole argues that property is not the law of things (at least insofar as
thing-ness implies tangibility), but is instead a law of information that
conforms to identifiable rules of information management and flow.
Although current theory does not conceive of property as pure
information, there has been much important thinking on the information
costs of different property forms and rules. Property is, under the view of
the information cost literature, an emergent product of the informational
characteristics of property forms. Specifically, property forms are a
function of the information that such forms convey to owners and third
parties. Through these forms, owners know what they can do with
resources, and third parties know what they cannot do. Communicating
which parties may do what with which resources at the lowest cost is
property’s project.
The following subparts therefore first consider information cost theory
before discussing a potentially useful addition to that theory. Where prior
theory has analyzed property in terms of information costs, this Article
takes the next natural step and treats property itself as an information
system.
1. Property and Information Cost Theory
Henry Smith and Tom Merrill have spearheaded renewed interest in
examining the information characteristics of property forms. Smith and (to
some extent) Merrill object to the “bundle of sticks” view of property on
the grounds that removal of a stick from the bundle disrupts the
fundamental informational clarity of the thing.190 In their terminology, if I
buy a bicycle for which I have all the sticks except the right to ride it on
Tuesdays, the fundamental integrity of the bicycle as a thing that one may
buy, sell, use, and exclude others from using is damaged.191 Others will
190. Merrill & Smith, The Morality of Property, supra note 187, at 1851.
191. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26–28 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Numerus
Clausus] (illustrating how creating property rights imposes “measurement costs . . . on strangers to the
title”).
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have to engage in expensive investigation to determine whether the bicycle
they are about to buy can be ridden on Tuesday or whether that right has
been quietly sold.192 Thus, the removal of the property “stick”
compromises the informational integrity of the object.193
Instead, Merrill and Smith proposed that property can best be
explained as the process of optimizing property rights by reducing
information costs for search, verification, or transfer. The literature can be
divided into two parts. First, Merrill and Smith addressed the range of
property forms. This is termed the numerus clausus: the notion that the
range of property forms should be a predetermined and closed set.194
Second, as Smith has recently written, individual packages of property
rights move more smoothly in the stream of commerce when they are
cleanly delineated and modular, so that each module can, like legal legos,
be transferred or rearranged into new and useful forms with minimum
transaction costs.195 This subpart addresses each in turn.
The numerus clausus, meaning “the number is closed,” is a principle
limiting the number of property forms.196 Parties are not free to vary the
form of property by contract. If parties attempt to create a new property
form, the rights are recognized as contractual but do not bind third parties
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 4.
195. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1175, 1187 (2006) [hereinafter Smith, Modularity in Contracts] (clarifying the role of
modularity in reducing transaction costs).
196. Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542, 542 (Mass. 1893) (“A man cannot create a new kind of
inheritance.”); Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 239, 243–44 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds.,
1987); Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 4, 13 (“[C]ourts enforce the numerus
clausus principle strictly (although not of course by name) in the context of estates in land.”); Richard
A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1 (2005); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in Translation, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 515, 541 (2013); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 790 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract]; Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 (2002) (arguing that the numerus clausus doctrine
aids verification of ownership rather than serving to standardize property forms); Henry E. Smith,
Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1780
(2007); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1160 (2003) [hereinafter Smith, The Language of Property]; Fairfield, supra note 20, at 1051–52;
Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1565–70 (2003); Heller, supra note
187, at 1176; Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti Commons: Property in Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being
and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1730 (2003); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 802–03, 810–13 (1996).
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as would a property interest.197
Merrill and Smith’s answer as to why property law should be so
constrained, at significant cost to the satisfaction of individualized
preferences, is that the limitation of form creates information cost
savings.198 Constrained choice means lower search and verification costs. If
the savings generated by a reduction in information costs are greater than
the efficiency loss engendered by constraining choice, the limitation on
forms increases social welfare.199 Consider buying batteries. If there were
only one kind of battery, then purchasing a battery would be simple. The
more kinds of batteries there are, the more effort one must invest in
determining the correct battery to purchase.
Choice raises information costs. It also increases satisfaction. The
question is how to best balance the range of choice that increases individual
satisfaction with the information costs increased by that range. This is an
optimization exercise.200 Increased choice beyond a certain point (see:
cable channels in the United States) does not increase human happiness.
Overly constrained choice (see: television channels in Germany) decreases
the degree of fit between human desire and result, which decreases utility.
The numerus clausus as envisioned by Merrill and Smith is a principle
of data management. It sets requirements for data format through its
restrictions on property forms.201 Consider property as a check-box
menu.202 One must select the property type: leasehold (subcategories: term
of years, periodic tenancy, tenancy at will, and tenancy at sufferance),203
freehold (subcategories: fee simple absolute, determinable, subject to
condition subsequent, subject to executory limitation), life estate, future
interest, or limited right (subcategories: easements, covenants, servitudes,
profits). Those transactions in which the proper datafields are correctly
entered pass with minimum friction through the system and are enforced by
courts. Those which do not are not enforced against third parties, although
197. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 196, at 378.
198. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 26.
199. See id. (“In the potential transfer situation, the individual will measure as long as the
marginal benefit in reduced error costs exceeds the marginal costs of measurement.”).
200. See id. at 69.
201. Id. at 33; Moringiello, Virtual Worlds, supra note 28, at 188–89.
202. See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 7 (“When unsophisticated or
poorly advised actors enter these worlds, they may find that courts force the transaction into one of the
established ‘boxes,’ with the result that the actors’ intentions are frustrated.”); id. at 12 (“The commonlaw system of estates in land is an area of property law universally recognized to have a ‘formalistic,
box-like structure.’”).
203. Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 191, at 832; Moringiello, Virtual Worlds,
supra note 28, at 185.
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they may be enforced contractually.
Merrill and Smith’s view that increased range of property formats
increases data costs to third parties has not gone untested. In offering a
critique of Merrill and Smith, Hansmann and Kraakman ask why the
addition of marginal novel property forms would necessarily impact preexisting forms.204 For example, the fee simple absolute might not become
more confusing as a property form just because a new and different form
was added to the list of forms. One answer to this criticism is that new
forms dilute the informational clarity of existing forms because a nontransacting party does not know which form she is receiving ex ante and
must investigate.205 This answer is, however, slightly too simple. Beyond a
certain basic number of forms, the addition of marginal forms is unlikely to
increase information costs as much or even at all. A more developed
version of the criticism would be, therefore, that the addition of each
marginal additional form of property does not linearly increase information
costs.206 As soon as there are two property forms, the need to verify the
form of the property obtains. Once someone must check to verify the form
of the property anyway, additional, marginal possibilities for that form
raise transaction costs much less. The information cost difference between
one and two forms of property is significant. The information cost
difference between the thousandth and the thousand-and-first form of
property is not.
2. Property, Information, and Modularity
The second major line of thought in considering the information
characteristics of property is the question of modularity, or how cleanly the
information of a property form is packaged, and how smoothly each piece
of property or property right interfaces with each other piece or right. The
modularity discussion is highly salient to the project advanced here:
developing a system for securely transferring property interests in the form
of packets of information. For digital property to attract users, it must offer
discrete, well-defined, constrained, and simple sets of rights.
Information costs can be reduced not only by limiting the range of
property forms, per the numerus clausus, but also by optimizing the data
characteristics of a particular property form by making it modular. The
204. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 196, at 380–81.
205. See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 33 (“Limiting the number of basic
property forms allows a market participant . . . to limit his or her inquiry to whether the interest does or
does not have the features of the forms on the menu.”).
206. Id. at 39–40 & fig.2.

848

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:805

numerus clausus discussion, above, focused on eliminating additional
property forms that impose search and verification costs on owners,
potential third parties, creditors, and others. The modularity discussion is
conceptually distinct.207 The focus is not on novel property forms that
expand the range of options through which third parties must search, but on
the packaging of information about property such that there are constrained
and clear information inputs and outputs.208
Modularity is a function of what Smith calls “nearly decomposable”
systems.209 That is, modules encapsulate complexity, and interface points
between modules are chosen for their simplicity. Modularity creates
simplicity by breaking problems up, encapsulating repeated and complex
interactions together, and then creating a neat and clean interface for the
rest of the system.
Modularity is both a method of information transfer and an
information cost reduction strategy. Someone seeking to use the system
need only deal with, change, or modify one module at a time. Consider the
common practice of cleaning a messy room by putting toys away in a box.
The same chaos reigns inside the box that previously affected the entire
room. Yet the packaging of the box has made the mess modular.210 The box
fits on a spot on the shelf. If a child seeks a specific toy and the boxes are
properly labeled, she need only search through the single box rather than
destroy the room searching through all the toys. Once the single toy is
found, the box can go back on the shelf, and the room is again clean.211
Or, consider the modular design of a car. Those parts that are
sufficiently tightly connected to one another are fitted together into a unit.
Complexity is contained with the unit, and outputs and inputs of the unit
are simplified. A given part that fails (usually my water pump) can be
removed and replaced without disrupting the entire system, since any unit
that performs that function and matches the inputs and outputs can be
207. See Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 195, at 1176 (“[M]odularity is a device to
deal with complexity by decomposing a complex system into pieces (modules), in which
communications . . . are intense within the module but sparse and standardized across modules.”);
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY
L.J. 1403 (2009) (discussing standardization and innovation through the concept of modularity).
208. See Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 195, at 1180 (“Forming a modular system
involves partially closing off some parts of the system and allowing these encapsulated components to
interconnect only in certain ways.”).
209. Id. at 1196.
210. See id. at 1176.
211. See id. at 1180 (“[A]djustment can happen within modules without causing major ripple
effects.”).
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exchanged for any other. Or, for those who build their own computers,
consider the modularity of RAM sticks. Enormous numbers of tiny parts
are layered together and given one clean interface with the rest of the
system. The complexity of the RAM stick is contained and packaged
neatly, so that a user need only slot the stick into the computer.
Modularity, like the numerus clausus, helps to explain property
characteristics and forms in terms of information costs. To this point, the
literature of information cost theory has done critical work setting the stage
for a theory of property as information. But current theory does not
sufficiently theorize property itself as information. Even the information
cost view of property remains strongly tied to physical objects. Remaining
bound to the physicality and tangibility of property poses a barrier to the
effective use of information cost theory to ground a robust and working
system of online property, as the next subpart explores.
3. Property Is a Law of Information, Not Things
If one accepts that information theory is central to the understanding
of property, the next step is to understand that property is itself an
information system. Extant theory on information costs in property pulls up
short, recognizing the importance of information to property forms without
recognizing that property forms are themselves information. Instead, the
information cost literature doubles down on the concept of property as the
law of things. For example, Smith writes: “I argue that the baselines that
property furnishes, as well as their refinements and equitable safety valves,
are shaped by information costs. For information cost reasons, property is,
after all, a law of things.”212 Thus, “[a]n ‘in rem’ right originally meant a
right ‘in a thing,’ and [Smith argues] that it is the mediation of a thing that
helps give property its in rem character—availing against persons
generally.”213 In this sense, the law gives a “special respect . . . to physical
objects [because] the objects themselves provide an excellent form of fixed
rule. The contours of an object . . . establish a boundary that is highly
resistant to revision in a particular dispute.”214
Treating property as the law of things, at least without a more nuanced
212. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691 (2012)
[hereinafter Smith, Property as the Law of Things].
213. Id.
214. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1765 (2004)
[hereinafter Smith, Property Rules] (quoting Emily Sherwin, Two and Three-Dimensional Property
Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1091 (1997)). See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 721 (1996) (noting the strong
preference for property rule protection of physical things).
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idea of the informational role of thing-ness in property law, would be a lost
opportunity. The risk is that any enhanced understanding of the
informational role of property would be limited to tangible things. The old
trouble would return: property law would continue to inadequately address
intangible property rights that do not fit squarely within intellectual
property law and would leave traditional property theory with no
conceptual approach that fits naturally in online environments. The next
subpart therefore engages the argument that property is the law of things. It
proposes a friendly amendment to the extant literature. Properly
understood, “thing-ness” in property law need not exclude online or digital
objects. (Indeed, Smith suggests such a tack in passing.)215 Things are just
one subset of information objects. To see this clearly, it is useful to
distinguish between a thing and an information object, discussed below.
a. Thing-ness in Property Law
For Smith, thing-ness is essential to modularity.216 Ownership rights
in a thing may be complex, but that complexity need not reach third parties.
Consider Blackacre.217 Property rights between owners may be complex—
interest holders may be remaindermen, joint tenants, renters, or any one of
a range of other possibilities, yet all the potential third party trespasser need
know is to keep out. As Merrill comments on Smith:
The proverbial Blackacre presents a simple rule of exclusion insofar as
the audience of strangers is concerned, a complex of formal rules when
potential transactors enter the picture, and a potentially limitless diversity
of rules and norms when the relevant audience consists of insiders such
as co-owners.218

Essential to Smith’s conception is the idea of a thing. Blackacre as a
thing carries informational content. The land in this example serves as a
proxy for the significant complexity going on inside the property form. A
potential trespasser need not become embroiled in the machinations of
interest holders in the property; she need only know that to enter another’s
land without permission is trespass.
215. See Smith, Property Rules, supra note 214, at 1754 (“The intuition that property rules are
particularly suited to the protection of things—and, unlike some, I include here intangible things—is no
accident.”). See also Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 212, at 1703 (“Property clusters
complementary attributes—land’s soil nutrients, moisture, building support, or parts of everyday
objects like chairs—into the parcels of real estate or tangible and intangible objects of personal
property.”).
216. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 212, at 1700–08.
217. See Thomas Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 151, 151 (2012).
218. Id.
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Yet here the argument for thing-ness, at least in the purely physical
sense, fails. The metes and bounds of Blackacre are not necessarily
physical, they are informational. Blackacre does not, properly understood,
exist apart from the information that defines its existence. The rocks, trees,
and land exist, of course, but they are not Blackacre. Blackacre is
comprised of information delineating and demarcating the land. There is
usually no physical line that demarcates the property from neighboring
land. Thing-ness is simply information about the limit of rights. This is true
even when there is an objectively discernable physical boundary to
property. To take an example from chattel property: if I own a small
framed picture, I might own 1’ x 2’ of painted canvas. If I own a larger
picture, I may own 2’ x 3’of painted canvas. The limit of the frame and the
concept that the picture is a unified “thing” (even though it is a composite
of paint, medium, backing, frame, and wire) serve to limit information
costs and make the picture modular, easily transferrable, sellable, and so
forth.
An overemphasis on physical rather than informational thing-ness
interferes with the information theory of modularity. Modules manage
complexity by packaging interrelated parts together.219 Those parts are
often themselves modules. Thus, a car is a module, but the parts of which it
is made are also modules. Smith notes this expressly as one of the strengths
of modularity in property: that property modularity allows the creation of
nested structures through limited recursion.220 But it also means that
“thing-ness” is itself something of a false construct. The thing-ness of a car
is decomposable to the thing-ness of its parts, which are in turn
decomposable to the thing-ness of components, which are of course
themselves further decomposable. “Thing-ness,” in the tangible sense, does
not tell us which thing, the component, the part, or the car, is the
fundamental unit of property. To mistake thing-ness, especially familiar
physical thing-ness, for the sine qua non of property, instead of the
information properties thing-ness represents, would sap much of the
strength of information cost theory as applied to property.
Rather, the same techniques of managing information costs by
constraining search costs and managing complexity by providing interface
points of constrained information inputs and outputs are the bedrock of
coded environments. These principles are not about thing-ness at all.
Instead, thing-ness is one way among many to manage information flow by
219.
220.

Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 212, at 1701.
Id. at 1707–08.

852

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:805

creating simple interfaces between data modules. It should be possible to
usefully amend information theory in property so as to preserve its value in
creating digital property systems. The following subpart therefore
addresses how information systems manage informational complexity
through modularity, before drawing some insights from information system
design for property rules.
b. Object Oriented Programming
Property is not the law of things, it is the law of data objects, whether
those objects are transferred by physical exchange or by changing a ledger
entry in a database.221 One way to see this is by analogy to computer code.
Code is a chain of logic, in which one action is logically defined along a
specific path, to lead to another action. Code can be written with long,
untrimmed chains of input and output variables, in which each action is tied
to numerous other actions. This tangle of logic is often referred to as
“spaghetti logic.” Such code does not manage complexity by limiting and
simplifying the interface points between different parts of the code.
Better-designed code creates “objects” that act, in an informational
sense, like Smith’s “things,” although they have no tangible or physical
component. An object in code is a package of functions that produces a
simplified output useable by the rest of the system. For example, imagine a
system designed by a bank to determine whether to make a loan to a
customer. One might design code that ties each input to each output—the
effect of the economy on the client’s future income, for example. The result
might be very accurate but also complex and difficult to change. A
different way of organizing the code would be to write one module, or
object, that would package all of the relevant factors together and spit out
one number: the interest rate at which it is currently profitable for the bank
to extend loans. Any number of considerations might go into such a
determination, yet the module spits out a single number. That number, then,
is the interface with other modules in the system. Those modules need not
recreate the entire sequence of logical manipulations that the interest rate
module did, they merely need to call the output variable of the interest rate
module. In the same way, the customer’s ability to pay might be a function
of a range of different variables reduced to a single number. That number,
too, can be passed to the rest of the system. The value in separating these
221. See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of
Consent, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 189, 189 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed.,
2007) (“Modularity became important to physical architecture in the first part of the twentieth century
and to the virtual architecture of computer science in the later twentieth century.”).
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modules out is that if one needs to change a component, one can do so
without disrupting many ties throughout the system. By intentionally
bottlenecking information flow between modules, a coder can ensure that a
change in one internal function does not disrupt the entire system. One
need not chase down every end of every tangled piece of logical spaghetti.
Modularity is, in a way, inefficient. It may be that a direct connection
between general economic bellwethers and income might produce a more
accurate estimate of income. Coders might be tempted to kludge
connections between every relevant input and the output they seek. But in
doing so, they lose the organizational structure of the code that makes it
easy to understand, maintain, pass on, swap out, and most of all reuse in
other coding environments. Once a good code object has been created, it
can be swapped out like a Lego piece to build entirely different structures.
c. Object Oriented Property
“Things” in property, like objects in code, are packages of closely
related data functions. Property systems and forms do not directly convey
physical assets, they convey packages of information. Property law does
not simplify things (at least not directly), it simplifies information flows.
Thus, property is the law of data objects, not the law of physical things.
Physicality of course creates certain data characteristics (uniqueness,
rivalrousness, persistence, and the delineation of a package of rights as tied
to the delineation of the “thing”) as natural byproducts, but we do not need
physicality to create clean data objects. Coders do not rely on tangible
thing-ness at all when they create modules that constrain information flow
to make the code more manageable. In the same way, digital objects do not
need physical thing-ness to benefit from the virtues of a property system.
Constraining and modularizing property forms ensures that the
information at the core of property is packaged in a way that can be moved
smoothly through the stream of commerce. But it is possible to mistake
these features for the point. For example, Merrill expresses concerns about
the modularity approach to property because it “fails to explain the limited
number of legal forms in which property can be held—the numerus clausus
principle.”222 It certainly does not, but this does not matter. Modularity
does not cause or explain the numerus clausus. Both the numerus clausus
and modularity proceed from the same principle: property is information.
Indeed, both the numerus clausus and modularity cease to be property
principles when they conflict with principles of efficient information flow.
222.

Merrill, supra note 217, at 154.
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For example, Smith discusses recursion: the ability to reuse modules in a
nested form to create new property structures (such as parts in a car, noted
above).223 However, recursion does not always reduce information costs.
Recursion can increase complexity when it is unlimited. Consider, as an
example of unbounded recursion, the famous wish for more wishes. While
the ability to do again what a system has done before is a core function of
automation, recursion is not an unlimited positive in information theory. It
is famously simple to trap information systems in an infinite loop with
recursion. Although the trope of Captain Kirk confusing a computer
adversary by posing a logical loop is campy,224 it conveys an underlying
truth: long or infinite recursive loops can damage and delay information
systems. The same is true for property systems. Recursive forms like the
fee tail have been abandoned, and rules against dead-hand control, such as
the rule against perpetuities, limit the grantor’s ability to recursively “reset”
ownership of land. Property systems, like other information systems,
protect themselves by limiting the number of times a recursive loop can run
on the system.
Property shares the considerations of object oriented programming
and many of its tools for managing information flow. The guiding principle
is one of information management: of rapid, effective, secure, and
verifiable information flow based on property forms. The next section
therefore bears down on this element of property: that property law forms a
protocol for the transmission, security, and verification of information, at
reduced cost. Or, more simply, if property is information, property systems
are information protocols.
B. THE PROPERTY PROTOCOL
The value of information cost analysis of property extends well
beyond property forms, to the system for conveying and verifying property
information. This section therefore outlines some principles of information
design that might further enable property systems to do the job of
conveying the core information of property at lower cost with increased
certainty.
If property is information, property systems are a protocol for
communicating, verifying, and protecting that information. To transfer land
from one person to another, one must transfer the information (the deed)
223.
224.
1967).

Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 212, at 1701.
See Star Trek: The Original Series: The Changeling (NBC television broadcast Sept. 29,
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that identifies the transaction (sale or ownership) and ties the successor
identity (buyer) to the resource (the land). To buy an MP3, one must record
the information (on a watermark or license server) that identifies the
transaction (license) and ties the successor identity (the consumer) to the
resource (the music). To generate a security interest, one must record the
information (in a UCC filing) that identifies the transaction (security
interest) and ties the secured party (usually the bank) to the resource (the
debtor’s collateral).
The traditional definition of property as the relationship of actors to
assets and to each other does not fall far from the mark.225 But the
traditional definition does not capture the degree to which property systems
not only require, but are in fact comprised of, information. The key player
in a property transaction is not the seller or the buyer, but the non-involved
third party, who is bound by the dispositions made by the negotiating
parties.226 The directly involved parties of course already have information
about the deal through their contract negotiations. They need no property
system to apprise them of the terms of their own deal. That can be handled
through contract rules designed to foster bilateral information disclosure.
By contrast, a true property system must deliver information to third
parties.227 First, non-parties need information about transactions with which
they are not at all involved. Assume A and B transact in land. Party C
needs to know the boundaries of the transaction entered into by A and B,
which constrains where C may hunt or fish.228 Further, non-parties need
information about transactions with which they are not involved yet.
Assume C wishes to buy the land from B. She will need information about
the A-B deal and all earlier deals.229 Finally, C needs access to change the
information, that is, the records, should she decide to become owner of the
land.230 The common thread is information. The essence of the property
system itself is not the identity, asset, or relationship between the parties, it
is the information about those elements, and the degree to which that
225. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 134 (noting the “widely accepted
definition of ‘property’ as the ‘relations among people with regards to things’” (quoting JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 1.1.1 (2d ed. 2005))).
226. See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 33 (discussing how “to control the
external costs of measurement to third parties”).
227. See Michael Trebilcock (Corresponding Author) & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and
Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397, 411 (2008) (“[A]
formal property system can also reduce transaction costs in market interactions by providing increased
information to third parties about the rights that an individual has over land.”).
228. See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 33.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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information is effectively stored, communicated, and verified.
Procedures for quickly, effectively, securely and cheaply
communicating information are, in information parlance, called
protocols.231 A protocol sets the format for data.232 It sets the procedures
for transmitting it. It determines to whom certain data should be sent. It sets
the procedures for error checking and the procedures for confirming that
the data has been received. It determines the routing procedures for moving
the data through a network. It sets procedures for lost or missing data.
I propose that a property system is an information communication and
storage protocol. There are good protocols—ones that permit maximum
information flow, accuracy, and security, and cause minimum confusion
and resistance. There are bad protocols—ones that engender confusion,
noise, uncertainty, and insecurity. Similarly, there are good property
systems—ones that permit transactions at high velocity, with high security,
and with low friction. There are bad property systems—ones that are time
consuming, costly, insecure, and inaccurate. The virtues are the same, and
so are the vices. Good property systems transmit information about who
may do what with which resources rapidly and securely, secure it faithfully,
and can verifiably reproduce it. Bad property systems fail at each of these
tasks.
Conceptualizing property systems as information protocols has
distinct advantages over extant property theories. As worked out above,
physical things themselves are not the heart of property.233 The bundle of
sticks—whether an owner may use, exclude, alienate, or destroy—is not
the heart of property. Personal identity is not the heart of property. Instead,
a theory of property as the data consisting of who may take which action
with respect to what asset, and the procedures for communicating,
231. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 294
(2007) (“The current Internet infrastructure evolved with the so-called ‘end-to-end’ design principle as
its central tenet. This design principle is implemented in the logical infrastructure of the Internet
through the adoption of standardized communication protocols (e.g., the Internet Protocol suite).”);
Julian Chokkattu, Bridging The Gap As The Smart Home Industry Expands, TECHCRUNCH (July 7,
2014),
http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/07/bridging-the-gap-as-the-smart-home-industry-expands/
(“[T]ech giants Google and Apple are just a few companies that have been looking to bridge
connectivity to different branded products with wireless communications protocols and break this
fragmentation.”).
232. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 91 (2003).
233. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 134 (“As Gilmore noted forty years
ago, . . . in asking property questions, we commonly conflate rights in things with the things
themselves.”).
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changing, verifying, and storing that data, cuts closest to the bone. As one
transaction follows another, forming a chain of title, we create a chain of
data relating each transaction to the next. The property system resides in
the procedures for tracking, transmitting, and verifying that information. A
property system enables transfers by conveying the information about who
now owns what. A property system enables exclusion—the most
commonly discussed element of property systems—by relating a what to a
not-who, that is, the set of people who are barred from making use of a
resource.
The received wisdom that traditional property is somehow foreign or
alien to information environments is incorrect. This error stems from the
underexplored and incorrect assumption that property is about physical
things, or about identity, or about specific actions one may take with
property. Identity, assets, and actions are all important parts of a
functioning property system, but they are not its substance. The substance
of property is information. If property systems are information systems,
then it must be possible to implement them in an information environment.
To test whether property-as-information-protocol can hold conceptual
water, it is useful to consider a few of the virtues of good information
communication and storage protocols, and to observe whether they have
explanatory power in the property context. Although there are many
descriptors of good communications protocols, three are discussed here,
loosely grouped around data at rest before it is sent, data in transit, and data
at rest after it has been received. The following subparts first describe how
these characteristics work in information environments before drawing
parallels to characteristics of property systems.
1. Data Formatting
A major challenge to information systems is ensuring that data follows
a simple format such that it can be transferred or searched with minimum
cost. Information can come in an infinite range of forms, some sufficiently
organized as to be useful to automated systems, and some so disorganized
as to be useless to anyone. Good data formats include necessary data and
exclude data—even relevant data—when it appears in a format that makes
parsing, processing, storage, or later accurate retrieval of the data more
difficult. A good data format constrains information to the essential fields
necessary for the transfer, storage, and retrieval of that information.
Further, the format constrains the range of ways in which information can
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be entered. It selects a standard.234 Such standards necessarily exclude
useful but more costly means of presenting information in favor of an
agreed-upon form.
The law of property operates as an information protocol in that it sets
standard formats for data. Assume that there is only one property format:
FSA (fee simple absolute). Under this regime, there are serious utility costs
due to constrained ability to satisfy preferences, but there are no
information costs. The recipient need not inquire as to the form of property
she receives. Now, assume we add a new hypothetical format: FSB. A
recipient must now inquire as to whether she is receiving FSA or FSB, and
costs rise. Here, we see Merrill and Smith’s information cost model at
work.235 But to incorporate Hansmann and Kraakman’s criticism,236
assume that we add an additional marginal format: FSC. The costs for
verifying the format of the property do not change. All that one must do is
exclude all results that are not FSA. To think of it another way, if one
desires FSA, one need not bother with all other formats, FSB through FSZ.
One must check, but as long as labels are clear, it is just as easy to see that
FSH returns a result of “no, this isn’t what I want,” as it is to see that FSQ
returns a result of “no, still not what I want.”
Theorizing the numerus clausus as a data format rule provides a
friendly amendment to Merrill and Smith’s theory, and addresses the
critique that, as property forms are added, the marginal additional
transaction cost steeply declines. The problem is not the total number of
forms, but the ability to differentiate between forms. Property forms must
be more than merely a little different; they must be different enough so as
to be distinguishable. The numerus clausus as amended here is therefore a
principle of the minimum difference necessary for differentiation. What is
necessary—and indeed, what property law offers at its core—is a system of
specific, constrained, parameterized property forms that are detectably
different from one another at low cost. The dangerous case is one in which
a given property format (say, FSA2) becomes confused with another (say,
FSA), such that one can check and still not know what format the property
takes. Worse is one in which a non-standard property form looks the same
as a mainstream, common property form on the surface, but is actually
different due to obscure or hard-to-obtain information.
234. The term “standard” is used here and throughout this Article in the technical sense of an
agreed-upon format for the transaction, and not in the legal sense of a fuzzy legal line.
235. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 27.
236. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 196, at 380–81 (arguing that the addition of property
forms would not necessarily generate a “meaningful degree of confusion”).
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A theory of property as information resolves much apparent
contradiction. With Merrill and Smith, I treat information costs as central to
the law of property. With Hansmann and Kraakman, I note that marginal
property formats do not linearly increase information costs.237 Finally, I
build on extant theory by noting that it is the ability to distinguish between
formats—and not the raw number of forms—that matters in creating a low
cost and high velocity property system.
2. Verification and Error Checking
Verification is a vital component of information protocols, and by
extension property systems.238 The value of information lies not merely in
its content, but also in the degree of certainty that the information was not
altered or corrupted in transit. Verification matters most if information is to
be passed further along to another party or another information system,
further spreading corrupted data. The flip-side of verification rules are
error-clearing rules. These rules exclude corrupt data so that it does not get
passed forward. Some error in a one-time transaction does not matter much.
Matters are different for information that must be passed forward based on
the prior chain of events. Accumulation of errors within a data chain, just
like the accumulation of clouds on title in a chain of title, will eventually
crash an information system or render an asset immobile in the stream of
commerce because title is too clouded.
Property systems have extensive error checking rules. For example,
title searches serve as a form of error checking for title-based systems. The
purpose of the search is not merely to make sure that the asset is
sufficiently unencumbered such that the buyer is not buying a lawsuit along
with her asset, but also to ensure that the information stream attached to the
asset is itself not so clouded or contaminated that the buyer would have
trouble selling the property forward.239 Similarly, when courts pay attention
to flaws in chains of title, they encourage prospective buyers to focus
attention on the chain of data. Many problems that are fixed as a result of
237. See generally id. (discussing verification rules in property).
238. Id. at 374, 380.
239. See, e.g., Feit v. Donahue, 826 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. App. 1992) (“[The] grantee under a
warranty deed, except for matters specifically enumerated therein, should be in much the same position
as [a purchaser of land with the] right to demand title which will put him in all reasonable security
against loss or annoyance by litigation and will enable him not only to hold his land but to hold it in
peace.” (alteration in original) (quoting Fechtner v. Lake Cnty. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 361 N.E.2d 575,
578 (Ill. 1977))); Chavis v. Gibbs, 94 S.E.2d 195, 197 (Va. 1956) (“The main purpose of recordation
statutes is to give constructive notice to purchasers and encumbrancers who acquire or seek to acquire
some interest or right in property.”).
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title searches are minor errors in the data chain, and clearing up small
errors prevents aggregation and improves the overall health of the registry.
Error clearing rules also abound in the law of property. For example,
rules of many different stripes protecting the rights of bona fide purchasers
and buyers in the ordinary course of business clear accumulated clouds on
title.240 These rules operate to insulate current transactions from errors in
prior transactions. For example, buyer in the ordinary course of business
rules ensure that when one purchases a flat screen television from Best
Buy, one need not be concerned with whether Best Buy has granted Bank
of America a security interest in inventory.241 If a consumer sells the flat
screen to another consumer, a different flavor of the same rule applies to
clear other complicating security interests that the seller might have left
still attached to the property.242 Sales law’s rules for voidable title and
entrustment ensure that bona fide purchasers for value and buyers in the
ordinary course are insulated from upstream title conflicts by clearing title
error in the hands of the purchaser.243 Or consider marketable title acts for
real estate, which only require a search back up the chain of title for a
statutory period of years.244 All prior transfers are considered good and do
not interfere with the registered chain of title. These rules for both real and
personal property have as many different variants as contexts, but each has
the salutary function of clearing errors in the chain of title so that mistakes
in prior transactions do not aggregate to immobilize the asset.
3. Data Security
The third major category is data security.245 Data must be secure both
in transit and at rest. Data must be routed to the proper recipient and not to
a third party who fraudulently attempts to stand in the shoes of the sender
240. See, e.g., Sender v. Cygan (In re Rivera), 513 B.R. 742, 753 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014)
(“Colorado is a race-notice state where no unrecorded instrument is valid against a bona fide purchaser
of the subject property who first records. Consequently, as long as an instrument is properly recorded,
subsequent purchasers have an obligation to find it at the county clerk and recorder’s office and are
considered to have constructive notice even if they do not locate it.”); U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (2010) (“[A]
buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a security interest created by the buyer’s seller,
even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.”); id. § 2-403(1) (“A
person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.”).
241. Id. § 9-320(a).
242. Id. § 9-320(b).
243. Id. § 2-403.
244. See, e.g., Unif. Marketable Title Act § 3(a) (1990) (“A person who has an unbroken record
chain of title to real estate for 30 years or more has a marketable record title to the real estate . . . .”).
245. There are, of course, other virtues of information protocols, which are excluded here due to
space constraints. Routing and addressing are major goals of a good transfer protocol. The data must go
to the party to whom it is addressed.
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or receiver. The question is whether these values are a core part of the law
of property.
Security has always been a feature of property. Gold has always been
kept in vaults. But the argument that security is a core and integral part of
property law is less immediately intuitive than it is for data formatting,
error checking, and error clearing. The security surrounding an asset has
rarely been directly conceptualized as a key element of the property itself.
Lack of built-in security has long been a driving factor for property law.
Developed rules preventing theft, trespass, and conversion are necessary
because property, especially personal property, is so easy to steal, subvert,
or convert.246
The strongest difference between property rules and information
security principles is that most property rules secure property by ex post
sanction (against thieves or trespassers), while much of information
security relies on ex ante exclusion through encryption or access controls.
The worse ex ante security is, the more costly and developed the ex post
system for recovering the assets must be.
As a result of property’s traditionally limited ex ante security, much
law is concerned with making sure that unauthorized transfers do not
threaten the information that possession of property conveys to third
parties. For example, property law strongly sanctions unpermitted
possession. It is not clear, without more, why it should do so—unpermitted
possession does the property no harm. One likely answer is that possession
is a powerful information rule.247 The fact of possession conveys
information so powerful that the person possessing property is considered
its owner for the purposes of all but a very few interactions, which are
based on some superior information source (say, being pulled over by
police who have run the plates).248 The best way to steal property is to hack
the property system by impermissibly obtaining possession, thereby
broadcasting ownership to the majority of people who encounter the thief
246. Of course, locks and safes exist, but they weaken a key feature of property, which is the
ability to use the goods openly without having someone take them. Property that cannot be used while
being locked up is not much good as property.
247. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78–79 (1985).
See also Smith, The Language of Property, supra note 196, at 1117–19 (discussing different possessory
rules and the informational content they provide to different audiences); Merrill & Smith,
Property/Contract, supra note 196, at 803 (“[S]ubstantive legal norms associated with in rem rights are
more likely to be expressed as rules that turn on one or a small number of publicly observable states of
fact . . . . The common law rule that the person in possession of a resource is presumed to have a
property right is one example.”).
248. See sources cited supra note 247.
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with the property. Thus, law sanctions unpermitted possession even if the
property is unharmed and the owner has not yet missed the property.
Traditional property principles provide security for information assets
as well. Consider domain names, which have been recognized by some
courts as sharing some characteristics with traditional property. In Kremen
v. Cohen,249 Judge Kozinski wrote for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Property is a broad concept that includes “every intangible benefit and
prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition.” We apply a threepart test to determine whether a property right exists: “First, there must
be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable of
exclusive possession or control; and third, the putative owner must have
established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.” Domain names satisfy
each criterion.250

Kremen considered the theft of a domain name obtained by deceiving
the centralized authority, then Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”), which
maintained the register of domain name registrations.251 Cohen exploited
NSI’s lack of security in the domain name ledger to illegitimately transfer
the valuable domain name Sex.com.252 His approach was low-tech social
engineering. He sent forged letters and faxes from the original registrant
claiming that the domain name had been abandoned.253 The effect was a
simple deletion of a claim on a registry. Once NSI had deleted the
registration, Cohen snapped up the domain name.254 The effect was to
transfer a valuable intangible and rival property interest through the
exploitation of a security loophole (here, NSI’s employees’ credulousness)
by modifying the ledger. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court
should not have rejected Kremen’s claim for conversion, and remanded. In
so doing, it applied entirely ordinary property rules to a ledger registration
change.255
While traditional ex post property sanctions can protect digital
property, new information security measures, such as advances in public
249. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
250. Id. at 1030 (citations omitted).
251. Id. at 1026–27. Kremen also considered the potential liability of NSI for its failure to prevent
Cohen from taking the Sex.com domain name. Id. at 1028–29. This part of the decision, bearing as it
does on an Internet intermediary’s responsibility to undertake expensive verification for a cheap
service, is more controversial, and is not touched upon here except to note that decentralized public
trustless ledgers ameliorate this problem by reducing the role of intermediaries.
252. Id. at 1026–27.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1036.
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ledgers and encryption, can also protect physical property. Consider smart
property: property that is enhanced with embedded software, and perhaps
further secured by linking the software to a slot on a block chain.256 Smart
property (at least in the sense of software-embedded and networked
property) is becoming the norm for objects usually considered traditional
personal property. Cars, houses, glasses, and watches are rapidly joining
smart phones and tablets as being primarily protected by software control.
A smart car linked to the block chain might “know,” for example, that it is
owned by the owner of a specific ledger entry, and will only start in the
presence of the person to whom that ledger entry is ascribed. Keys cannot
be duplicated because the slots on the ledger are rivalrous. The same
public-key encryption infrastructure that has long secured information can
now secure physical property against theft.
In sum, this part has argued that the conceptual core of property is not
tangible things, not identity, and not sticks from the bundle, but
information. As information, property is formatted, transferred, verified,
and stored through a variety of protocols that share the virtues of good
information transfer protocols. The rules of property set strong data
formats, verify data, clear errors, and store information securely against
manipulation or theft. Viewing property in this way paves the way for an
actual operational digital property system. The following part offers
suggestions for how to use trustless public ledger technologies to build
such a system, as well as addressing challenges to the view of property
espoused here.
III. OPERATIONALIZING BITPROPERTY
The preceding parts have described a potentially disruptive technology
for tracking peer-to-peer and decentralized ownership interests, and have
shown how such technology lays bare the nature of property as
information. This part offers specific suggestions for how to clear away
conceptual rubble in order to build a working system of digital property,
and addresses potential conceptual challenges to the approach offered
above.
A. NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS TO CURRENT THEORY
A theory of property as information complements existing conceptions
of property. Under a theory of property as information, the identity of the
owner, attributes of the asset, or the nature of the relationship are just data
256.

Ethereum, supra note 94, at 5:33.
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to be formatted, transferred, verified, stored, and secured by a given
property system. The property protocol does not dictate the goal of the
system or transaction, whether that goal be efficiency, productivity,
ensuring maximum exploitation of resources, or self-actualization. There is
therefore very little tension, and in fact significant synergy, between other
accounts of property and an information-based approach.
Nevertheless, there are some inconsistencies between some views of
property and a theory of property as information. Property-as-information
is inconsistent with the contention that legal categorizations in property
should have anything to do with physicality. For property-as-information to
take hold as an operative legal theory, property theory must dispense with
physicality (or, conversely, intangibility) as the characteristic used to sort
asset categories, and replace it with an analysis of rivalrousness and
scarcity. Practically speaking, this will mean a rebalancing and reduction of
the role that intellectual property has played in the online ecosystem. This
section addresses each in turn.
1. Disentangling Tangibility
There are significant conceptual obstacles in the law of property,
which if unchecked will substantially impede the cost and security gains
made possible by trustless digital architectures. The first and most
significant of these is the role that tangibility plays in courts’
characterization of assets. As Juliet Moringiello notes, tangibility has long
stood as a bad proxy for rivalrousness.257 Block chain technology provides
strong practical evidence against the notion that intangible assets cannot be
rivalrous. The law of property must definitively abandon the connection
between tangibility and rivalrousness if property law is to survive the
transition to online contexts.258
Tangibility is a bad proxy because it is both imprecise and
unnecessary. Tangibility stands in for two distinct variables, scarcity and
rivalrousness. Scarcity is a function of supply and demand. If there is more
of a thing than people who want it, it is not scarce. Rivalrousness is a
measure of exclusivity of possession. If person A holds a rivalrous
257. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 137 (“Despite the fact that individuals
commonly think of intangible rights embodied in almost worthless tangible things as property,
intangible rights unconnected to tangible things continue to confound judges.”).
258. Id. at 120, 140 (“[T]he category of ‘tangible’ is irrelevant in property law and . . . commercial
law must discard distinctions based on the physical manifestations of assets and focus instead on the
legal qualities of those assets . . . . This habit is a harmful one because it directs judges and lawmakers
to look to intellectual property law rather than property law generally for rules to govern electronic
assets.”).
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resource, person B does not. Physical resources can be scarce, rival,
neither, or both. Air, for example, is physical, but neither scarce nor rival.
A rock is rival but not scarce. A chance to hear Joshua Bell play in the
Washington metro is scarce but not rival.259 A gemstone or a bitcoin is
both.
Tangibility is therefore a bad substitute for scarcity and rivalry. An
asset may be rival and tangible, in the form of traditional personal property.
An asset may be intangible and non-rival, in the form of traditional
intellectual property. An asset may be intangible, rival, and scarce, as are
bitcoins. Or an asset may be intangible, rival, and non-scarce, as would be
entries in a non-capped public ledger. As the following subpart will
demonstrate, when courts fail to make precise distinctions about scarcity
and rivalry, and instead rely on the crude proxy of physicality, they both
wrongly apply intellectual property protections to non-intellectual property
intangible assets, and deny the protections of basic property law to the
owners of such digital objects.
2. Differentiating Digital and Intellectual Property
One of the most marked difficulties in the development of online
commerce has been the failure to develop a distinct theory of digital
property that can withstand the incursions of intellectual property law.260
The result is that many consumers own practically nothing online. Where
they once owned bookcases full of books, consumers now have limited
access to accounts with Amazon Kindle that can be erased at the whim of
the copyright holder.261 Where consumers once had record or CD
collections, they now have nothing upon ending a relationship with a music
streaming service.
There are both legal and technological aspects to this failure. The
technological infrastructure of e-commerce has grown up around an
ostensible truth of online assets: that because there is supposedly no way to
prevent duplication of digital assets, any digital rights system must rely on
a centralized list and list-verification authority to keep track of who may
access which content. Legally, this centralization was accomplished
259. Gene Weingarten, Pearls Before Breakfast, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/04/AR2007040401721.html/.
260. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 141 (“[C]ourts and some scholars tend to
give new intangible rights the ‘intellectual property’ label.”).
261. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html.
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through intellectual property rules.262 A central list curator can hold the
copyrights and issue limited licenses to consumers. This creates a hub-andspokes legal framework that fits the perceived need to create and verify a
centrally maintained list. Given that decentralized ledgers of rival, nonduplicable interests are practicable, it is time to reexamine whether
intellectual property remains the best governing law for non-intellectual
property interests in discrete and rival digital objects.
Consider an MP3 track. If the track resides on a compact disc, it is
considered tangible, and its owner gains certain rights from possessing the
physical disc—for example, the ability to resell the specific copy under the
first sale doctrine.263 Yet if that track resides on the cloud,264 its
intangibility is construed by courts as presenting the possibility of infinite
forward copying, the ultimate non-rivalrousness.265 It does not matter much
to courts that the MP3 on the CD could be copied forward, nor does it
appear to matter under current doctrine if an MP3 residing on the cloud
were not susceptible to forward copying.
This debate about rivalrousness and intangibility of digital goods is
currently shaping the next generation of Internet startups and technologies.
For example, Capitol Records v. ReDigi266 examined whether an online
marketplace committed primary and secondary copyright infringement for
aiding customers in reselling their used MP3 files.267 ReDigi, the
defendant, attempted to create a market for used MP3s by deleting each
copy as it was being migrated for sale or transfer to ReDigi’s cloud
service.268 By dint of deletion-upon-migration, ReDigi achieved a crude but
262. See id.
263. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that
UMG’s distribution of promotional CDs transferred ownership of those copies to their recipients, such
that further sale of those copies was permissible under the first sale doctrine).
264. See Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011), available
at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf (“Cloud computing is a model for
enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”).
265. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to the movement of copies, since digital copies
can be transmitted nearly instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and negligible
cost. The need to transport physical copies of works, which acts as a natural brake on the effect of
resales on the copyright owner’s market, no longer exists in the realm of digital transmissions.”
(quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 82–83 (2001),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf)).
266. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 640.
267. Id. at 648–52.
268. Id. at 645.
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functional form of rivalrousness.
To use the ReDigi market, consumers were required to download a
local client.269 That client then ensured that any file that was uploaded to
the ReDigi marketplace was deleted from the local hard drive. The local
client also scanned the computer for illicit attempts to retain a copy of the
sold file.270 The upload process used by ReDigi ensured that only one copy
of the file was ever in existence before, during, or after upload for resale.271
Once the song was uploaded to ReDigi’s cloud service, it could be resold
without copying by merely changing which user had access to the uploaded
copies.272 These elaborate precautions were necessary because the law of
copyright posed a significant threat to the ability of a user to transfer their
particular ownership in a single copy. This, indeed, was the result of the
decision: the ReDigi court determined that a transfer of a digital object
across the Internet could not be accomplished without creating a new and
infringing copy.273 The court interpreted intellectual property law to ban an
emerging technology that attempted to create discrete, rival rights in
intangible assets.
Particularly telling was the ReDigi court’s reliance on a United States
Copyright Office report, which took express note of the debate over
whether so-called “forward and delete” methods could create rival digital
objects subject to traditional property rules.274 The report noted:
Additionally, unless a “forward-and-delete” technology is employed to
automatically delete the sender’s copy, the deletion of a work requires an
additional affirmative act on the part of the sender subsequent to the
transmission. This act is difficult to prove or disprove, as is a person’s
claim to have transmitted only a single copy, thereby raising complex
evidentiary concerns. There were conflicting views on whether effective
forward and delete technologies exist today. Even if they do, it is not
clear that the market will bear the cost of an expensive technological
measure.275

To the Copyright Office and the courts, the problem of copying
intangibles appeared insoluble with then-extant technology. Courts
therefore resolved the question in favor of copyright holders, forcing digital
269. Id.
270. Id. at 645–46.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 651.
274. Id. at 655–56 (discussing how the Digital Millennium Copyright Act impacts distribution of
digital works).
275. http://U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 265, at xix.
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assets back into the intellectual property mold. Yet even if the Copyright
Office’s determination were correct at the time, it has been overtaken by
technological development.
The Copyright Office was concerned about copying and cost. Both
concerns can be ameliorated by cryptologically sound ledgers. As above,
duplication and double spending are two sides of the same coin. A user can
no more spend a token in a block chain and keep it than she can give it to
two different entities. Imagine a system in which the token acts as a key,
permitting access to music streamed from a server. In this way, the music
would not be duplicated by passing on the key to another user, permitting
transfer without copying. While this form of duplication protection is not
perfect, it does provide superior security to current solutions, at
significantly lower cost. The technology outcompetes (especially on price)
centralized technological measures such as rootkits, license servers, and
other DRM traditionally employed by copyright holders. Thus, the cost
prediction of the Copyright Office was incorrect. Block chain based ledgers
strongly resist falsification, duplication, and double spending, and they do
so at a cost low enough to support very high volume, low value
transactions.276
One can read cases like ReDigi as merely demonstrating judicial
caution in the face of developing technology. Yet the concept of tangibility
continues to exert influence across the board. For example, in a range of
cases construing when a product developer may access computer code to
build a product that is interoperable with another, the cases align nearly
perfectly along the tangibility/intangibility axis. If a business wants to
manufacture a universal garage door opener or television remote or
refillable ink cartridge that avoids a printer manufacturer’s software
restrictions, it may do so.277 If the product is entirely intangible, a
combination of contractual restrictions, licensing rights, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) can stop its development.278 The
development of new digital products and services requires that intellectual
property make room for traditional ownership rights online without the
physicality hook that has traditionally been required.
276. Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities,
Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 149–50 (2014).
277. Molly Torsen, Note, Lexmark, Watermarks, Skylink and Marketplaces: Misuse and
Misperception of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Anticircumvention Provision, 4 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 117, 120–22 (2004).
278. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 637, 641–42 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
game developer whose employee clicked on a license agreement agreed to forego DMCA
interoperability and reverse engineering protections).
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3. Establishing Block Chain Neutrality
The prior two subparts have discussed problems within the common
law (which prefers tangibility) and statutory framework (which
overemphasizes intellectual property) that stand in the way of an
operational digital property system. This subpart clears similar conceptual
rubble from the perspective of potential regulators. This Article has
attempted to demonstrate that trustless public ledgers can be put to a range
of quite different uses. The danger is that block chain technologies as a
whole may be cabined to one use case by the development of a specific
legal regime, say, payments and money transmission services, and not left
open to other potential uses.
Block chain technology should be regulated based on how it is being
used, not on an attempt to determine what the technology is. Multiple,
completely separate use cases can coexist side-by-side on a single block
chain. The block chain is neutral. It is simply a protocol for tracking
information about rivalrous digital interests that provides a strong solution
to the duplication problem without requiring a central curating authority.
From the perspective of financial crimes enforcement, general law
enforcement, and anti-money laundering or counter-threat-finance efforts,
cryptocurrencies are a barely tolerable innovation because the technology
can be used to transfer value among criminals.279 Under this view,
regulators will work to reduce the fluidity and pseudonymity of trustless
property systems. This is in response to many news stories describing the
use of Bitcoin to purchase drugs, guns, or pornography.280 The approach is
tinged with some new-technology hysteria, but has a serious point. There is
no question that cryptocurrencies, like cash, will facilitate bad acts. The
question is whether a ban or highly constraining regulation will do more
harm than good.281
There is a growing consensus that block chain technologies will be
regulated.282 A multi-voiced discussion among regulating entities, industry,
279. See Laurie Law, Susan Sabett & Jerry Solinas, How to Make a Mint: The Cryptography of
Anonymous Electronic Cash, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1136–37 (1997) (noting that the free
transferability of money may facilitate crime).
280. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Follow the Bitcoins: How We Got Busted Buying Drugs on Silk
Road’s Black Market, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/andygreenberg/2013/09/05/follow-the-bitcoins-how-we-got-busted-buying-drugs-on-silk-roadsblack-market/ (highlighting a study which found that 295,435 out of over a million identified Bitcoin
transactions had drug market ties).
281. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 167 (noting that there is “some interest in trying to limit or
ban bitcoins”).
282. Zachary Warmbrodt, Bitcoin Gets Ready for the Government, POLITICO (Nov. 14, 2013, 4:59
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consumer protection advocates, and legal academics is already taking
shape.283 There is a strong case for careful regulation: almost all use cases
for trustless technology stem from permitting people to trade something of
value. Indeed, that is the purpose of trustless technology. Trading things of
no value does not require a trustless system, since there is no problem of
trust.
Wise regulation of trustless technologies will take note of the multiple
different use cases to which the technology can be put. It will avoid
applying financial regulatory rules to startups that use the Bitcoin block
chain for non-financial purposes. It will discriminate between value
transfer systems, like property transfer registries, and financial use cases,
like cryptocurrencies. It will sharply define the limits of rules that do cover
financial use cases, so as to not impinge on co-extant non-currency uses.
Finally, wise regulators will rapidly reevaluate and update rules as new use
cases emerge. Although these updates will sacrifice some certainty, a
humble, iterative, experimental approach to regulation will permit
entrepreneurs to explore the technology for potential breakthrough uses.
B. CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES
Whereas the prior section laid out pragmatic changes in the law that
will be necessary to operationalize a true digital property system, this
section will address conceptual counterarguments that challenge the theory
advanced above. As proposed above, the essence of property is not things,
not identity, not relationships, not sticks from the bundle, but information.
As a corollary, property systems are information transfer and storage
protocols. To this theory one might address several related criticisms, with
which this section engages.
1. Is Information Separate from Property?
A critic might first argue that while information about property is
important, and while it should be communicated through secure networks
and stored in secure facilities, this does not provide any support for the idea
that the heart of property is information.284 The critic might strongly
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/bitcoin-gets-ready-for-the-government -99893.html.
283. Sydney Ember, New York Proposes First State Regulations for Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (July 17,
2014, 3:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/lawsky-proposes-first-state-regulations-forbitcoin/. See also sources cited supra notes 281–282.
284. See, e.g., Timothy P. Terrell, “Property,” “Due Process,” and the Distinction Between
Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861, 865–74 (1982) (suggesting that the essence
of property is made up of the following three entitlements: the rights of exclusion, powers of transfer,
and privileges of use).
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differentiate between information about property and property itself. This
conceptual move might be accompanied by a strong distinction between a
physical, tangible thing and information about that thing.
The proposition that property law sets up an information protocol does
not merely concern information about property.285 Rather, the flow of
property interests is itself information that percolates through human
systems. Consider a fictitious tribe with an economy based on trades in
shells.286 Those shells carry information, not just about the shells
themselves, but about the goods and services one can command with those
shells. The allocation of shells serves as a history of transactions. The
shells serve as a social memory of all past deals.287 One might replace the
shell system with a system in which an elder of the tribe with perfect recall
must witness all transactions—that is, the shells serve as a substitute for a
system in which there is perfect memory.288 In short, the property system
and the information system are interchangeable. They are the same thing.
Property is a way of recording the state of resource distribution in a
society.289 It is not a catalog of all resources, but an information system
designed to record the distributional decisions by which all members of the
society are bound. Cash in a wallet is as much a record of resources at an
individual’s disposal as is an entry in a bank account. Similarly, possession
and ownership of a car serves as a record of the history of transactions that
has caused that particular group of components to be assembled and
brought to the point where it is parked in someone’s driveway and at their
disposition. Property itself, its location, amount, possession and use, is thus
an information system recording the current state of social resource
allocation. Like the movement of beads of an abacus, the movement of
property is itself information.
2. Is Information Subordinate to Property?
Another potential contention might be that information is important to
property, but is subordinate to some other characteristic. For example, a
285. Although such information plays a significant part and is, under this theory, at least some of
the information that must be transferred.
286. See William J. Luther & Josiah Olson, Bitcoin is Memory, 3 J. PRICES & MARKETS 22, 23
(2015) (discussing the relationship between money and memory); Narayana Kocherlakota & Neil
Wallace, Incomplete Record-Keeping and Optimal Payment Arrangements, 81 J. ECON. THEORY 272,
273 (1998) (discussing money as an imperfect memory-keeping device); Narayana R. Kocherlakota,
Money is Memory, 81 J. ECON. THEORY 232, 233 (1998) (describing the movement of money as a
method of storing information about resources).
287. See sources cited supra note 286.
288. See Luther & Olson, supra note 286.
289. See sources cited supra note 286.
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critic might note that records—information—do not constitute definitive
proof of ownership in many jurisdictions. If the record is proven to be
incorrect, the “true” owner will prevail. One might conclude from this that
information is subordinate to some other characteristic of property, and that
the property interest does not reside in the data, but in some other feature of
the thing itself, the transaction, or the relationship of the parties.
This criticism significantly underestimates the primacy of information
in property. A record of property ownership is only overturned on better
information—better data—about who ought to be considered the actual
owner. That is, there is no true, absolute owner. There is only the owner
indicated by the best information that the legal system can access. While it
is true that information about ownership stored in land records and verified
by the procedures of the clerk’s office can be trumped by information
stored in human minds (testimony) and verified by the procedures of the
court during litigation, the question remains one of information. The owner
is the entity to whom the best information points. The property right resides
in the information.
A similar challenge might arise from transfers of property by secret
deed or private delivery of a gift. In such a transfer, the information about
the transfer is not available to third parties, yet law seems to recognize the
transfer. If property is an information transfer protocol, a critic might
reasonably ask, how can it be that the legal system treats secret property
transfers as valid? A response might be that the property right propagates
as a function of information propagation. Consider information as ripples in
a pond, spreading from the point of origin. As between the transferor and
transferee, the secret transfer is effective. Consider again C, a non-party to
the transaction, who learns about it from A or B. C promptly loses bona
fide purchaser status upon hearing of the transfer. Wherever the
information flows, it shifts the relationship of the parties with respect to
one another and to the asset.
3. Is All Information Property?
A final contention might be that conceptualizing property as
information presses too far and implies that because property is a kind of
information, all information is property. Such a criticism would, if correct,
raise serious cause for concern with advocates for less propertization of
information and for more access to knowledge. But the criticism would be
inapt. Property is merely one kind of information system. All information
cannot and should not be made into property, and that is not the contention
of this piece. On the contrary, the approach suggested here demonstrates
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that property is a special subcategory of information. Property is the subset
of information systems that record transferrable, scarce, rival, persistent,
and sharply delineated data objects. This holds for transfers of real estate,
personal property, smart property, and digital property. Consider, for
example, a proposed transaction in which someone wishes to sell a digital
object—a bitcoin, a digital magic sword in a game, or a used MP3. A buyer
will want to know whether the object is transferrable (Can the buyer
actually obtain it from the seller?), persistent (Will it hold value?), rival
(Can the seller retain a copy and resell it?), scarce (How hard is it for the
buyer to obtain her own?), and sharply delineated (Are there clouds on
title? Is there lack of clarity as to whether the asset is being bought or
licensed?). Most information does not possess the characteristics of
transferability, persistence, rivalry, scarcity, or delineation that are
necessary for digital property rights. Such information should not be
considered property.
While all information is not property, all property is information.
There is an important balance. Courts must not propertize non-rival and
non-scarce information resources outside of the confines of the intellectual
property system. Yet they must also learn to apply traditional property rules
to scarce and rival intangible resources. There will be significant difficulty
in finding the right balancing point and in calling close cases. Rivalry and
scarcity are continuous, not discrete, variables. Assets can be more or less
scarce, and more or less rivalrous. While easy cases like Bitcoin will fit
smoothly into the law of property because of their clear scarcity and
rivalry, hard cases will arise at whatever balancing point courts select. The
existence of hard cases should not prevent courts from recognizing
decentralized, rival, and scarce digital property interests.
CONCLUSION
Ledgers are the backbone of modern and sophisticated property
systems. Such systems must keep track of millions of transactions worth
trillions of dollars, must be kept up to date, must be accurate, and must be
low-cost to maintain. Until recently, accomplishing this task without a
centralized and trusted authority was not practical. As a result, property
ledgers are split up among different verification authorities. They are hard
to access, difficult to reach and search, and comparatively easy to
manipulate or compromise.
Block chain technologies promise significant gains in efficiency,
certainty, and security over traditional methods of creating and tracking
legal rights. They offer the possibility of decentralized and secure ledgers
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to maintain digital property, currency, county land records, mortgage
interests, security interests, stock ownership, and much more. Trustless
public ledgers track transactions in real time, at comparatively low cost.
The fact that ledgers are public means that they are available to anyone to
track the flow of interests, permitting users to manage risk and monitor
exposure. In online ecosystems, transaction costs are everything. The
inability to track property interests cheaply has meant that property law has
not yet come into its own online. With the advent of block chain
technology, there is a serious chance it may do so.
The invention of a decentralized property technology for intangibles
offers an opportunity to reflect on the tortured history and uncertain future
of digital property. Unlike electronic contracts or cybertorts, digital
property is only now being born, after a long and hard labor. The core
problem is that true digital rivalry and scarcity have been difficult to create,
and the common law of property associates traditional property rules with
tangible things rather than informationally compact data objects. As a
result, courts have assumed that traditional property rules are simply
inapplicable to online information-based resources, and have misapplied
and overextended intellectual property law to fill the gap.
What is needed, and what this Article has attempted to provide, is a
theory of property as information. Property is not merely a system for
constraining information costs by limiting form choice and modularizing
clearly delineated packages of rights in things. Property is a system for
formatting, transmitting, verifying, and securely storing information tying
together identities, rights, and resources. Such an approach not only permits
significant improvements on currently extant information cost theory, but
also directly confronts the pernicious view that traditional property has no
place online. Once the conceptual blocks that have prevented the full
bloom of digital property online have been cleared away, the common law
can put the cost savings and scaling effects of networked communications
technologies to work to create an operational system of digital property.

